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COLLABORATIVE FAMILY-MAKING:
FROM ACQUISITION TO INTERCONNECTION
PAMELA LAUFER-UKELES*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN a consumer-driven society, it should come as no surprise that babymarkets are booming.1  Indeed, we can use a catalogue to pick the pre-
ferred genetic traits of intended children,2 or even to peruse potential
children for adoption.3  Adults want to have children in order to build a
family.  Family provides status, stability, security, joy, support, and com-
fort.4  But, when biological or social infertility comes between modern
* Professor of Law and Professor of Health Management, Academic Center
of Law & Science, Hod Hasharon, Israel.  Thanks to Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Michele Goodwin, Naomi Cahn, Sonia Suter, Jody Lynee Madeira, Nancy Dowd,
Rahdikha Rao, Laurence McCollough, Ruth Zafran, Rachel Rebouche, and all the
participants of the 2017 Baby Markets Roundtable and the 2018 Law & Society
Panel on Human Rights in the Americas for their helpful comments.  This Article
is dedicated in memory of John A. Robertson, a pioneering scholar in the field of
reproductive technologies and baby markets, who provided me with helpful and
encouraging comments.
1. See BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES
(Michele Goodwin ed., 2010) (edited edition of articles discussing the growth of
baby markets); DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 77, 80 (2006); Naomi Cahn, The
New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367 (2012) (discussing rising use of purchased third-
party gametes); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial
Intimacy, Surrogacy, Adoption, 88 INDIANA L.J. 1223 (2013) (discussing local and for-
eign markets in surrogates); Seema Mohapatra, Stateless Babies & Adoption Scams: A
Bioethical Analysis of International Commercial Surrogacy, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 412,
415–17 (2012); Amrita Pande, Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India: Gifts for
Global Sisters?, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 618 (2011) (describing the rise of
foreign surrogacy in India).
2. See, e.g., Arianna Eunjung Cha, Discounts, Guarantees & the Search for ‘Good’
Genes: The Booming Fertility Business, WASH. POST (October 21, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/donor-eggs-sperm-banks-and-
the-quest-for-good-genes/2017/10/21/64b9bdd0-aaa6-11e7-b3aa-c0e2e1d41e38_
story.html?utm_term=.733a27ecfd0e [https://perma.cc/2FUH-YX4H] (describing
the selection process for gamete donors).
3. See Clare Foges, Delayed Adoption is Sure to Damage a Child, THE TIMES (Octo-
ber 2, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/delayed-adoption-is-
sure-to-damage-a-child-bclzhndx7 [https://perma.cc/Z7RM-MDBR] (describing
catalogs for children looking for their “forever homes”).
4. See, e.g., Christine Overall, What is the Value of Procreation?, in FAMILY-MAK-
ING: CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL CHALLENGES 89, 89–105 (Franc¸oise Baylis & Carolyn
McLeod eds., 2014) (deliberating on the various reasons people want to have chil-
dren, including status); Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, From Contract to Status: Col-
laboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293,
303–13 (2015) (discussing social value and special legal status of family relation-
ships, especially in caring for dependent family members).
(223)
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consumers and their family-building goals, new collaborative methods
have been sought, methods that necessitate financial investment in lieu of
sexual intimacy.
There are two primary alternatives to coital reproduction: assisted re-
productive technologies (ART) and adoption.  First, one can pay for fertil-
ity services such as in vitro fertilization (IVF) to produce desired children,
and there is also the option of collaboration—buying gametes, or renting
wombs through surrogacy from third parties.5  The use of ART can be
managed locally or, particularly in the case of surrogate motherhood, sur-
rogates can be hired from abroad.6  Second, one can adopt an infant or
very young child, which also entails considerable investment of money,
time, and resources.7  Infant adoption can be done domestically, although
a limited number of infants are available each year, or internationally
through intercountry adoption (ICA).8  ART involving third-party gametes
or surrogates’ wombs and ICA are both methods of what I term “collabora-
tive family-making,” which have been developed to fulfill the family-form-
ing desires of socio-economically secure people who seek the procreative
collaboration of those who are usually less well-off financially, increasingly
foreign, and destitute.9
5. See Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A New and
Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 55–59 (2003); Emily
Gelmann, “I’m Just the Oven, It’s Totally Their Bun”: The Power and Necessity of the
Federal Government to Regulate Commercial Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements and Pro-
tect the Legal Rights of Intended Parents, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 159 (2011) (couch-
ing the need to legalize surrogacy in the context of helping to fulfill couples’
procreative desires); Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Ges-
tational Surrogacy Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391 (2012); Elizabeth S.
Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109,
137–44 (2009) (discussing the satisfaction and success attributed to commercial
surrogacy as well as the way surrogacy has been accepted in contemporary society).
6. Reasons to look abroad for surrogates include illegality in one’s home
country, lack of availability of surrogates in one’s own country, lower expenses, and
desire to remain distant from the surrogate. See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1,
at 1266–67.
7. For now, I set aside the fostering of older and special needs children to
build a family.  Indeed, due to government subsidies, one can adopt an older or
hard to place child at little personal expense, but such an option is often consid-
ered to be less attractive to those who are primarily looking to solve infertility. See
infra notes 194–197 and accompanying text.
8. Also called “international adoption.”
9. See, e.g., Tobias Hubinette, From Orphan Train to Babylifts: Colonial Traffick-
ing, Empire Building, and Social Engineering, in OUTSIDERS WITHIN: WRITING ON
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 139, 143 (Jane Jeong Trenka, Julia Chinyere Oparah &
Sun Yung Shin eds., 2006) (discussing ways in which international adoption in-
volves wealthy westerners looking to poor countries to obtain children); Lila
Khabibullina, International Adoption in Russia: “Market,” “Children for Organs,” and
“Precious” or “Bad” Genes, in INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION: GLOBAL INEQUALITIES AND
THE CIRCULATION OF CHILDREN 174, 183 (Diana Marre & Laura Briggs eds., 2009)
(“Stories about biological mothers who cannot afford to keep their children and
rich foreigners who can buy them present international adoption as an unequal
transaction between the rich and poor.”); KAREN SMITH ROTABI & NICOLE F.
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Despite the reality that ART and adoption are two means of collabora-
tive family-making, the legal treatment of ART and adoption are markedly
distinct.  ART is largely unregulated, the exchange of money to third par-
ties for gametes and wombs is widely considered unproblematic, and even
highly commercialized global markets in surrogates are accepted in many
jurisdictions.10  On the other hand, adoption is heavily regulated and fears
of commodification and corruption ubiquitous, particularly in the context
of ICA, which has come to a near stand-still in the wake of fears of im-
proper payments to birth mothers, child laundering, and fraud.11  Explicit
references to markets and revelations of transfers of money have led to
shutdowns and bans in ICA, and the process of legally rooting out finan-
cial incentives has undermined the functioning of ICA in fundamental
ways.12
Accordingly, while markets in designer babies are thriving, ICA,
where children are most desperately in need of basic food and care, suf-
fers the most legal condemnation and restriction when its market qualities
become too apparent.  Although people insist  that baby-buying is im-
moral and illegal in the context of ICA, people use money to create babies
through ART and buy parental rights to babies in the market all the time
through surrogacy and gamete sales, creating what can be called “the baby
markets dilemma.”
The willingness to fuel global markets in designer babies alongside
the rapid decline in allowing ICA of children in need creates a moral la-
cuna that demands analysis.  In trying to resolve the asymmetry between
the ART and ICA methods of collaborative family-making some have ar-
gued that markets should be allowed in both,13 while others argue that
both methods involve improper commodification and exploitation, and
therefore should be legally banned, especially in the context of commer-
cial surrogate motherhood.14  But most scholars and jurists differentiate
BROMFIELD, FROM INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION TO GLOBAL SURROGACY: A HUMAN
RIGHTS HISTORY AND NEW FERTILITY FRONTIERS 2 (2017) (“An international adop-
tion is most commonly completed by middle- and upper-class families, most often
by prospective parents who are predominantly White and have completed a univer-
sity education.  This social dynamic is partly driven by the fact that cost for in-
tercountry adoption in recent years typically ranges from US$25,000 and
upwards.”).
10. See infra notes 43–76 and accompanying text.
11. See infra part II(B).
12. See infra notes 92–149 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for
Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 247–50 (2009) (referring both to markets in
ART and adoption as two examples of baby markets that should not be overly
restricted such that middlemen profit while participants fail to reap benefits).
14. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Surrogacy as the Sale of Children: Applying Lessons
Learned from Adoption to the Regulation of the Surrogacy Industry’s Global Market in Chil-
dren, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 265 (2016) (arguing that international laws against baby-
selling applied to ICA apply equally to international surrogacy).
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the two, arguing for the benefits of one method over the other.15  While
the difference in legal treatment of collaboration in adoption and ART
can be justified by a variety of legal arguments, including arguments re-
garding the definition of parenthood and the rights of children not yet
born that I explore in depth,16 I argue that the similarities make such
markedly different legal treatment of the markets and money involved in
each hard to justify.  This is especially true in comparing the legal treat-
ment of ICA and commercial surrogacy, which I describe as the most in-
volved and intimate collaborative form of ART.  Adoption suffers from
fundamental concerns of exploitation and commodification of birth fami-
lies and children.  ICA is widely viewed as a “ ‘gray market’ surrounded by
bribes, exploiting intermediaries,” and inappropriate treatment of chil-
dren and birth mothers.17  But surrogacy poses similar threats of com-
modification and exploitation of the surrogate and the child.18  Surrogacy
involves women becoming pregnant for a sum of money, resulting in an
extensive period of having one’s body used fundamentally for the sake of
strangers, in a manner that can be controlling and threatening, mitigating
rights to health care, informed consent, and autonomy.19  In addition, pa-
rental rights are relinquished in exchange for that sum.20  In international
surrogacy in particular, distance—geographic, linguistic, cultural, and
socio-economic—makes the treatment of the surrogate as an incubator for
hire an overwhelming concern.21  In both contexts of collaborative family-
making, the specter of the wealthy westerner looking to the poor and the
foreign to help them cure their infertility by providing wombs for rent or
children for adoption fundamentally threatens to exploit and commodify
human beings in a manner that stains collaborative family-making.22
In this Article, I  suggest a new way to resolve the baby markets di-
lemma by reframing collaborative family-making as a process of intercon-
15. Compare, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS (1999) (promoting
ICA over fertility markets), with Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
297 (1990) (arguing for the benefits of ART); see also ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra
note 9 (describing the rise of international surrogacy in the wake of the decline of
ICA but arguing for differing legal treatment of each).
16. See infra notes 151–164 and accompanying text.
17. Khabibullina, supra note 9, at 177.
18. See infra notes 157–193 and accompanying text.
19. Id.
20. See In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1143 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1987) ($10,000
payment provided for release of the child and termination of parental rights, re-
duced to $1,000 if the surrogate suffers a miscarriage after the fifth month of preg-
nancy); Janet Dolgin, Status & Contract in Surrogate Motherhood: An Illumination of the
Surrogacy Debate, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 515, 523 (1990) (describing the exchange of
money for the relinquishment of parental rights); Margaret J. Radin, Market-Ina-
lienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1929 (1987) (arguing that the difference in
perspective between surrogacy as baby-selling and renting of gestational services
concern whether the surrogate is a lawful parent).
21. See infra notes 184–193 accompanying text.
22. See infra Part IV(A).
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nection as opposed to acquisition of procreational capacities.23  Instead of
allowing ART markets to thrive and trying, mostly unsuccessfully, to curtail
the commercialization of a functional system of adoption,24 I argue that
the frame of interconnection can salvage the benefits of both methods of
collaborative family-making while mitigating the stain of commodification
and exploitation.  Neither women nor children—nor parts thereof—can
be bought or sold in the market, and therefore an “acquisition” frame for
surrogacy and adoption is problematic.  The traditional legal framework is
acquisitional in that it allows intended parents to pay for the receipt of
desired children by a transaction that ends all legal ties with collaborators
without consideration of children’s rights, or the exploitative and com-
modified nature of these transactions.  Instead, children must be pro-
tected as human creatures and not commercial goods, and all human
parties to the creation should be recognized and respected as more than
mere incubators or child producers amongst the poor masses in foreign
countries that can be consumed and then discarded when no longer use-
ful.  A frame of interconnection involves open processes and the facilita-
tion of ongoing contact between collaborators in family-formation even
23. See Elizabeth Bartholet & David M. Smolin, The Debate, in INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION: POLICIES, PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES 244 (Judith L. Gibbons & Karen
Smith Rotabi eds., 2012) (“The most fundamental problem is money . . . [referring
to Guatemala] unaccounted-for funds incentivized systematic child laundering”);
David M. Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 281,
283–86 (2004) (identifying money as the source of corruption); see also infra notes
97–101 and accompanying text.  A number of countries have laws reflecting the
manner in which it is believed that commerciality taints surrogacy, see Surrogacy
Arrangements Act 1985, c. 49, § 1A (U.K.), inserted by Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 36(1) (U.K.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act,
S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 6(1) (Can.), despite the lack of surrogates that result; see also
Sarah Mortazavi, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for International
Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249, 2270–73 (2012) (providing an overview of other na-
tions’ surrogacy statutes); Denise Balkissoon, “It’s Illegal to Pay a Surrogate Mother in
Canada So What Would Motivate a Woman to Do It?”, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 12,
2015), www.theglobeandmail.com/life/parenting/an-inside-look-at-thedifficult-
process-of-surrogacy/article22953150/ [Permalink unavailable].
24. See, e.g., Richard Carlson, Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New
International Law of Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 733, 755–69 (2010-2011) (dis-
cussing difficulties and limited success in creating functional adoption systems that
meaningfully fight corruption); Caeli Elizabeth Kimball, Barriers to the Successful Im-
plementation of the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Re-
spect of Intercountry Adoption, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 561, 569–71 (2005); Kate
O’Keeffe, Note, The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000: The United States’ Ratification of
the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children, and its Meager Effect on International
Adoption, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1611, 1615 (2007) (discussing the bureaucracy
that the Hague Convention imposes that increases costs, delays and time); Kathe-
rine Sohr, Comment, Difficulties Implementing the Hague Convention on the Protection of
Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: A Criticism of the Proposed
Ortega’s Law and an Advocacy for Moderate Adoption Reform in Guatemala, 18 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 559, 565–74 (2006) (discussing how difficult it is for Guatemala to
comply with regulatory and bureaucratic hurdles of Hague Convention due to the
lack of resources).
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after a child is born or adopted.  Collaboration creates connections be-
tween persons—children are not acquired and “consumed.”
The frame of acquisition that I reject, however, can be distinguished
from the presence of financial exchange.  Money is often targeted as the
cause for the corruption in ICA,25 but rooting out money and financial
incentives undermines collaborative family-making systems, which is
needed to fuel a functioning system of ART or adoption and denies
needed remuneration for surrogate labor and families in need.26  Markets
and intimate concerns are not incompatible—they interact all the time in
the context of human relationships, as well as family-making.27  Rather, as
one commentator explains, the question is, “How to organize a transac-
tion between takers and givers without the child or the mother being
turned into merchandise?”28  Or, asked differently, how a market in col-
laborative family-making be regulated in an ethical manner?29  I argue
that collaborative family-making can avoid the frame of acquisition and
consumption, despite the exchange of money that is bound to persist, by
regulating the market dynamics through a frame of interconnection fo-
cused on openness and ongoing contact with collaborators in a manner
that treats them as human participants as opposed to commodified, dis-
posable beings used for their bodies’ procreational capacities.
An interconnected legal framework that stresses the importance of
maintaining openness and ongoing contact between collaborators pro-
vides an intermediate path between full embrace or complete rejection of
collaborative family-making.  Such a regulated “intermediate” framework
is currently missing in hotly contested debates between those who pro-
mote surrogacy or adoption as currently practiced,30 and those that argue
that either or both systems of commercial collaborative family-making are
25. See infra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 13, at 247–50 (discussing the fundamental
market elements of both ART and adoption and how limiting payments to surro-
gates or birth families denies compensation to those most in need despite hand-
some profits for intermediaries).  For a discussion of how money fuels ICA, see
infra notes 94–148 and accompanying text.
27. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 29 (2005) (discussing
her theory of differentiated ties where money and intimacy interact); Ertman,
supra note 5, at 55–59 (discussing mixed commodification in the context of gam-
ete sales); Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491,
493–96 (2005) (discussing mixed commodification in the context of family law).
28. Anne Cadoret, Mothers for Others: Between Friendship and the Market, in Inter-
national Adoption: Global Inequalities and the Circulation of Children 271, 280
(Diana Marre & Laura Briggs eds., Margaret Dunham trans., 2009).
29. See Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify:
That is Not the Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN
LAW AND CULTURE 362, 369 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
30. See Bartholet & Smolin, supra note 23, at 245–46 (arguing that fears of
fraud are overstated and can be combatted without prophylactic bans); Elizabeth
Bartholet, International Adoption: The Child’s Story, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 333 (2007)
[hereinafter Bartholet, The Child’s Story]; Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adop-
tion: Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151 (2007)
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either essentially problematic,31 or that the existence of fraud requires up-
rooting commerciality in a manner that undermines effectiveness.32
Thus, in light of the many benefits involved in each, I attempt to salvage
both methods of collaborative family-making albeit in a limited and highly
regulated open and human form that I argue is still feasible but will suffer
less from concerns of commodification, exploitation, and corruption.
An array of social science studies, which are relied upon in this Article
to develop this vision of interconnection, have shown that in the case of
domestic surrogacy, surrogates and intended families develop close con-
nections with one another during the pregnancy, which naturally contin-
ues after the pregnancy as well.33  Studies in domestic adoption
demonstrate the growing dominance of openness and interconnection as
well, with complex relations between birth mothers, adoptive families, and
children that have been found to be healthy and secure.34  Children de-
sire and benefit from such openness and ongoing contact with birth fami-
lies as do birth families and adoptive families.35  In reality, in the context
of domestic adoption and surrogacy, what starts with the desire to “pro-
cure” a child, usually ends with familial collaboration and interconnected-
ness based on mutual respect and ongoing contact.
When it comes to international family-formation, much can be
learned from domestic systems in which interconnection is more common
and respected and bargaining power is more equal.  Domestic adoption is
open because birth mothers have the power to demand ongoing connec-
[hereinafter Bartholet, Human Rights].  For supportive accounts of markets in ART
and surrogate motherhood, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Shani King, Challenging Monohumanism: An Argument for Changing
the Way We Think About Intercountry Adoption, 30 MICH. J. INT’L. 413, 425 (2009)
(“Whether the exchange is viewed as one between birth parents with very few re-
sources, and families with resources, or as one between a country with an extensive
(admittedly imperfect) social service infrastructure and a country with no social
service infrastructure, the exchange bears a neo-colonialist hue.”); Twila L. Perry,
Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and Feminist Legal
Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 103–04, 103 n.12 (1998) (describing the rea-
sons to contest mixed race adoptions and the fear of neo-colonialism).  For discus-
sions and cites of authors who see surrogacy as fundamentally problematic for a
variety of reasons see infra notes 167–170 and accompanying text.
32. See Bartholet & Smolin, supra note 23, at 244 (“The most fundamental
problem is money . . . [referring to Guatemala] unaccounted-for funds incen-
tivized systematic child laundering”); Smolin, supra note 23, at 283–86 (identifying
money as the source of corruption); see also infra notes 97–101 and accompanying
text.  A number of countries have laws reflecting the manner in which it is believed
that commerciality taints surrogacy, see Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, c. 49,
§ 1A (U.K.), inserted by Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37,
§ 36(1) (U.K.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 6(1) (Can.),
despite the lack of surrogates that result. See Sarah Mortazavi, It Takes a Village to
Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249,
2270–73 (2012); Balkissoon, supra note 23.
33. See infra notes 177–183 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 251–258 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 259–266 and accompanying text.
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tions with adoptive families and their birth children.36  Domestic surro-
gates are present with intended families and thus natural empathy
develops as part of the process.37  One reason people use international
surrogates and ICA is to get away from these connections.38  Intended
families prefer not to deal with emotional ties with surrogates and adop-
tive families are afraid of biological parents, and ICA provides a comforta-
ble way to avoid them.  ICA is closed, secretive, and absolute.39  Foreigners
are treated differently—they are too often otherized and dehumanized.
Interconnection to foreigners is viewed as less practical and less feasible,
and more subject to fraud and thereby dehumanization and separation is
justified.  This Article thereby provides a timely reference to globalization,
when rates of global migration are at precedent setting heights along with
attendant fears and recriminations, suggesting a system of ICA that can
build bridges between cultures and allow the transfer of money and re-
sources between people who live with relative excess with those who are
desperately in need.40
In this Article, I suggest that the descriptive reality of interconnected-
ness and ongoing contact in domestic surrogacy and adoption be reflected
in the legal frameworks for collaborative family-making ex ante; that the
law frame and support collaborative family-making as interconnection as
opposed to acquisition and procurement of desired children whether do-
mestic or global.  I have argued for interconnectedness between the surro-
gate and the intended family in the context of surrogacy in the past,41 and
surrogacy is discussed to provide context to the ethical dilemma of baby
markets, contrasting its treatment to that of ICA, and to develop the new
frame of interconnection in collaborative family-making.  This Article,
however, ultimately focuses on the need to develop a new interconnected,
open system of ICA in light of its diminishing significance.  Only an open
and transparent form of ICA more in line with domestic adoption in
which adoptive families and birth families meet and have ongoing contact,
36. See infra notes 254–255 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 241–246 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Franc¸oise-Romaine Ouellette, The Social Temporalities of Adoption
and the Limits of Plenary Adoption, in INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION: GLOBAL INEQUALI-
TIES AND THE CIRCULATION OF CHILDREN 69, 77, 81 (Diana Marre & Laura Briggs
eds., 2009) (discussing distance as a motivating factor in ICA); Laufer-Ukeles, supra
note 1, at 1269–71 (discussing the greater detachment between intended parents
and surrogates in global surrogacy in India); Pande, supra note 1, at 618–20 (dis-
cussing distance as a motivating factor in international surrogacy); Jennifer A.
Parks, Care Ethics and the Global Practice of Commercial Surrogacy, 24 BIOETHICS 333,
334 (2010) (discussing intended parents preference for international surrogates
for detachment and lack of complications).
39. See infra notes 286–296 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 335–337 and accompanying text.
41. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1251–59.  As will be discussed hereinaf-
ter, see infra note 268, international surrogacy may be impossible to sustain within
this frame of interconnection and thus I argue it should be avoided to the extent
possible. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1275.
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and where limited, regulated, wealth transfer is permitted, can combat the
specter of fraud marring and undermining ICA.42
Following from the introduction, this Article will be structured in four
additional parts.  In the second part, I will describe the current system of
ART markets and adoption, discerning how the legal system has treated
the two systems distinctly.  In the third part, I will consider justifications
for treating collaborative family-making through ART and adoption so dif-
ferently, but then challenge this distinction by pointing to legal, sociologi-
cal, empirical, and historical similarities.  In the fourth part, I will present
a new frame of reference based on interconnection as opposed to acquisi-
tion appropriate for both forms of collaborative family-making, relying on
empirical accounts of interconnection in domestic adoption and domestic
surrogacy.  Finally, in the fifth part, I will describe a different vision for
adoption that accepts the need for money to keep ICA functioning, but
refuses to erase the existence of birth families who relinquish children as a
result of the poverty and instability they suffer.  Thus, I argue for an open
system of ICA, with continued connection between birth families and
adoptive families, with financial remittances paid from adoptive families to
birth families, and facilitated by government agencies that support open-
ness and contact.
II. DISTINCT LEGAL TREATMENT OF ART V. ADOPTION
A. ART is a Booming Business
ART is a booming billion-dollar business with minimal regulation.43
Couples who suffer from physical or social infertility are willing to spend
large sums of money in order to obtain healthy infant children.44  Success
rates are improving gradually with improvements in technology, but costs
are still dramatic.45  In the U.S. surrogate motherhood costs over $100,000
and egg donation around $20,000 depending on the “quality” of the do-
42. See infra notes 283–239; 320–321 and accompanying text.
43. See Ellie Kincaid, A Booming Medical Industry in the U.S. is Almost Totally
Unregulated, BUS. INSIDER (July 7, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/assisted-
reproduction-ivf-industry-regulation-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/A36K-AX5M] (not-
ing that in 2013, 1.5% of all births used IVF – the number of IVFs increased by
21% in the year between 2012-2013); see also SPAR, supra note 1, at 33; ALEXANDER
STYHRE & REBECKA ARMAN, INSTITUTIONALIZING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLO-
GIES: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE 12–16 (2016) (summarizing the use of ART as a market
in babies).
44. See Donna Rosato, How High-Tech Baby Making Fuels the Infertility Market
Boom, MONEY (July 9, 2014), http://time.com/money/2955345/high-tech-baby-
making-is-fueling-a-market-boom/ [https://perma.cc/M3DA-YMSW] (“The infer-
tility services market, from infertility clinics and sperm banks to fertility drugs and
surrogacy programs, now tops $3.5 billion, up four-fold from 25 years ago, accord-
ing to a recent study from research firm Marketdata . . . . Overall, growth in the
infertility market is projected to continue at a 3.6% annual clip, hitting $4 billion
by 2018.”).
45. See id.
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nor.46  Each IVF cycle costs approximately $12,000 + $5,000 for medica-
tions and usually more than one cycle is needed for egg removal, while
sperm donation is much less expensive at around $500 as is intrauterine
insemination at $2,000.47  Only approximately 25% of health plans cover
fertility treatments.48  Despite costs, 12% of women use fertility services.49
As one reporter succinctly characterizes the industry,
The multibillion-dollar fertility industry is booming, and experi-
menting with business models that are changing the American
family in new and unpredictable ways.  Would-be parents seeking
donor eggs and sperm can pick and choose from long checklists
of physical and intellectual characteristics.  Clinics now offer vol-
ume discounts, package deals and 100 percent guarantees for
baby-making that are raising complicated ethical and legal
questions.50
ART is thus a commercial endeavor, expensive for its consumers and
profitable for its agents.  The public at large in the U.S. does not shy away
from its commercial fabric, or provide federal regulation to limit its com-
merciality or to protect children born from ART, although scholars and
regulation in other countries raise more concerns.51
Minimal regulation in the U.S. includes a federal law that requires
fertility clinics to report IVF success rates, which the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) collects and publishes.52  There is no legal
regulation in the U.S. limiting what procedures can be done using ART.53
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Cha, supra note 2 (“According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 12 percent of American women 15 to 55—7.3 million—have used
some sort of fertility service; the use of assisted reproductive technologies has
doubled in the past decade.”).
50. See id.
51. See Cahn, supra note 1 (proposing a regulatory system for donor-con-
ceived families); Radikha Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology & Repro-
ductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1478–81 (2008) (describing the lack
of regulation of ART in the U.S. and describing the potential for regulation).  For
discussion of international regulations of ART, see Connie Cho, Defining
Parenthood: Assisted Reproduction in France, 7 YALE J. MED. & L. 19, 19 (2011); V
Fineschi, M Neri & E Turillazzi, The New Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction Technol-
ogy (Law 40/2004), 31 J. MED. ETHICS 536, 537 (2005).
52. See Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 263a-1—7 (2000).  Most states do not have any laws regulating ART.  A notable
exception is Louisiana, see LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:129–130 (2000) (providing that “[a]
viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which shall not be inten-
tionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical person or through the actions
of any other such person.”).
53. Human cloning is explicitly prohibited in many states. See generally Embry-
onic and Fetal Research Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (Jan. 1,
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/embryonic-and-fetal-research-
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Most IVF clinics self-regulate by complying with the guidelines of profes-
sional organization such as the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (ASRM) and the Society of Assisted Reproductive Technologies
(SART).  SART and ASRM also collect data on fertility treatments, based
on which they designate guidelines for good practice.54  Such guidelines
point to maximum embryo transfers, the preferred age and health condi-
tion for IVF candidates, among other guidelines, what is to be done with
millions of fertilized eggs that are not used for implantation, how to deal
with the ability to tinker with these eggs using CRISPR—issues that some
other countries regulate but the U.S. does not.55
Most relevant to this Article focused on collaborative family-making is
donor-assisted reproductive technologies.  In these forms of ART, it is not
just medical intervention that is purchased, but human investment as well
in the form of the purchase of gametes or wombs or both.  Gamete sales
are on the rise exponentially.56  The donor-egg industry, in particular, has
taken off in the past decade with the development of a safe and reliable
egg-freezing process.57  “The number of attempted pregnancies with do-
nor eggs has soared from 1,800 in 1992 to almost 21,200 in 2015.”58  Yet,
there is virtually no regulation in the U.S. governing egg sales.  Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations require registration of eggs and
sperm (human tissues) at registered clinics, and sellers59 must be tested
laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/8M9Z-8FEW] (reporting sperm cannot be used for
purposes of artificial insemination without certain laboratory testing protocols).
54. See SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., https://www.sart.org/ [https://
perma.cc/7VPU-ESHJ] (last visited Nov. 24, 2018); AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED.,
https://connect.asrm.org/home?ssopc=1 [https://perma.cc/G44T-CZ8U] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2018); see also Rosato, supra note 44; MODEL ACT GOVERNING AS-
SISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AGENCIES 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/family/Model_Act.authcheck
dam.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6V6-94VM] (“The two largest professional medical
organizations for reproductive medicine, American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (“ASRM”) and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
(“SART”), have issued practice and ethical guidelines for their members. However,
membership in the organizations is voluntary and the guidelines are self-
regulated.”).
55. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Welcome to the Wild West: Protecting Access
to Cross Border Fertility Care in the United States, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 349,
356–58 (2012).
56. See NAOMI CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS
LEGAL REGULATION 25–28 (2009); Cha, supra note 2.
57. See Pam Belluck, What Fertility Patients Should Know About Egg Freezing, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/health/eggs-freez
ing-storage-safety.html [https://perma.cc/339Q-9CTE] (“Several years ago, clinics
began using a process called vitrification, in which the temperature of the eggs in
the liquid nitrogen is dropped so quickly that they are frozen ‘truly in a matter of a
second,’ Dr. Goldman said.  Eggs frozen by that method are less vulnerable to
damage when thawed.”).
58. Cha, supra note 2.
59. While regulations and literature refer to gamete sellers as “donors”—the
fact that they are obviously highly compensated should not be masked in “donor”
language.
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for certain communicable diseases and positive tests make sellers ineligi-
ble.60  Eggs are essentially bought and sold on the free market.61  Sperm
and eggs are chosen for their genetic attractiveness and shopped for like
any consumer good in the market.62
Surrogate motherhood is another form of ART involving collabora-
tive family-making.  It raises more concerns and is subject to more regula-
tion, even in the U.S.63  In surrogacy, involving a contract-pregnancy, it is
harder than in gamete sales to ignore the ongoing human component as
the womb that is “rented” remains attached to the human participant who
is subject to contractual controls and impositions for a significant amount
of time.64  While gametes provide highly valued and well-compensated ge-
netic components, the participation of third parties is occluded by the ex-
traction during a relatively quick procedure.  Yet, despite the appreciably
greater regulation of surrogacy, commercial surrogacy is legal in many ju-
risdictions,65 in widespread use, is a growth business, and is only becoming
more popular year over year,66 both in terms of demand and in actual
60. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2018).  Specimens from reproductive tissue donors
must be tested for the following infectious diseases (referred to as “relevant com-
municable disease agents and diseases” in the regulations): Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus (HIV), types 1 and 2 Hepatitis B Virus (HBV), Hepatitis C Virus
(HCV), Treponema pallidum (i.e. syphilis), Chlamydia trachomatis, and Neisseria
gonorrhea.  In addition to those listed above, sperm donors must also be tested
for: Human T-lymphotropic virus (HTLV), types I and II Cytomegalovirus (CMV).
61. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 1, at 369–74 (describing lack of regulation of
gamete donations); Ertman, supra note 5, at 55–59; Michele Goodwin, Relational
Markets in Intimate Goods, 44 TULSA L. REV. 803, 805 (2009).
62. Gametes are chosen based on academic and athletic prowess, beauty, simi-
larity to intended parents, and health profiles. See Krawiec, supra note 13, at
220–23.
63. See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation: Work for Hire or the Essence of Moth-
erhood? A Comparative Legal Analysis, 9 DUKE J. GENDER & L 91 (2002) (reviewing
state surrogacy laws); Brock A. Patton, Note, Buying a Newborn: Globalization & the
Lack of Federal Regulation of Commercial Surrogacy, 79 UMKC L. REV. 507 (2010) (re-
viewing in detail the laws governing surrogacy in the U.S. and abroad).
64. See infra notes 176–182 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar, International Commercial Surrogacy and Its Parties,
43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2010) (“Interestingly, while most legal systems
around the world have sought to uniformly outlaw or heavily regulate other mar-
kets wherein humans or their parts are bought and sold—including human traf-
ficking, embryo trafficking, prostitution, and internal organ selling—they have not
yet done so with surrogacy.”); Cyra Akila Choudhury, The Political Economy and Le-
gal Regulation of Transnational Commercial Surrogate Labor, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1, 40–41 (2015).
66. See Kiran M. Perkins, Sheree L. Boulet, Denise J. Jamieson & Dimitry M.
Kissin, Trends and Outcomes of Gestational Surrogacy in the United States, 106 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 435 (2016); ART and Gestational Carriers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/art/key-findings/gestational-carriers.html
[https://perma.cc/U43K-4RNJ] (“In the U.S., the number of gestational carrier
cycles increased from 727 (1.0%) in 1999 to 3,432 (2.5%) in 2013.”) (last updated
Aug. 5, 2016).
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usage of surrogates.67  Surrogates and agencies can demand high fees and
consumers of surrogate services are willing to invest huge sums of capital
to realize their procreative desires.
Commercial surrogacy has also gone global.68  Given the shortage of
the number of surrogates available domestically for “westerners” who re-
present the highest demand population, the market is looking abroad.69
Furthermore, most of Europe and Asia prohibit surrogacy domestically.70
England and other commonwealth countries prohibit commercial surro-
gacy, only allowing the payment of expenses in exchange for surrogate
services; therefore, fertility consumers who do not have a friend or relative
willing to act altruistically must look abroad to find surrogates.71  Others
simply seek surrogacy abroad due to lower cost and greater distance from
the surrogate.72  In the past, India, Nepal, and Thailand all had booming
economies in international commercial surrogacy worth billions of dol-
lars;73  however, these domestic governments have become weary of the
international market, and now allow only domestic surrogacy arrange-
ments.74  Still, international surrogacy continues to be a big business, find-
ing different locations where local governments are more supportive, such
as the Ukraine, Georgia, Laos, and certain districts in Mexico.  Nigeria,
Guatemala, Malaysia and Kenya are potentially new markets that are cur-
rently being explored.75  Where there are wealthy people intent on using
67. As Demand for Surrogacy Soars, More Countries are Trying to Ban it, THE ECON-
OMIST, May 13, 2017, https://www.economist.com/international/2017/05/13/as-
demand-for-surrogacy-soars-more-countries-are-trying-to-ban-it [https://perma.cc/
RNY3-UE55].
68. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1265–67; Ryznar, supra note 65, at
1009–12; Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and
Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 298–99 (2005).
69. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1266; Mutcherson, supra note 55, at
356–58.
70. See Marcelo de Alcantara, Surrogacy in Japan: Legal Implications for Parentage
and Citizenship, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 417, 420–21 (2010) (discussing bans on surrogacy
in Europe and Asia).
71. See, e.g., Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 44 (Austl.); Assisted
Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.); Surrogacy Arrangements Act
1985, c. 49. (U.K.).
72. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1269–71; Pande, supra note 1, at
618–20; Parks, supra note 38, at 334.
73. See Usha Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: Interna-
tional Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 22 (2008)
(describing India as a top destination for international surrogacy); see also Danielle
Preiss & Pragat Shai, The Dwindling Options for Surrogacy Abroad, THE ATLANTIC, May
31, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/05/dwindling-op-
tions-for-surrogacy-abroad/484688/ [https://perma.cc/5WPY-S5RX].
74. See infra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
75. See Karen Smith Rotabi & Nicole Footen Bromfield, The Decline in In-
tercountry Adoptions and New Practices of Global Surrogacy: Global Exploitation and
Human Rights Concerns, AFFILIA J. OF WOMEN & SOC. WORK 129, 134 (2012) (dis-
cussing rise of international surrogacy in Guatemala); Preiss & Shahi, supra note
73; Current Law, SURROGACY 360, https://surrogacy360.org/considering-surro-
gacy/current-law/ [https://perma.cc/KKB6-3CGR] (last visited Nov. 25, 2018)
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surrogates, a global market is likely to arise.  Even in countries where com-
mercial surrogacy is banned domestically, foreign surrogacy is either per-
mitted or practiced in a gray space without notice or prosecution.76
Ultimately, although more constrained, the market in international com-
mercial surrogacy is still very strong.
ART is not baby-buying, as the child is not yet born, but does involve
paying money to obtain a child. In the case of collaborative ART with gam-
ete donors and surrogates, it is paying for parental rights to the child as
well, thus it does involve a market in babies.77  In the context of commer-
cial ART, the commodification of bodies involved in such baby markets is
largely accepted, hardly regulated, wildly profitable, and increasingly use
and popularized.
B. The Regulated, Limited, and Disappearing Systems of Adoption
The other way for those suffering with infertility or who want to ex-
pand their family to engage in collaborative family-making is adoption.78
In stark contrast to ART, adoption is highly regulated and not overtly com-
mercial.  In fact, commercial adoption is anathema as unethical and illegal
baby-selling.79  Despite some attempts to argue for the benefits of a free
market in babies,80 which have been highly criticized,81 it is commonly
assumed that children who are already born cannot be bought or sold
legally or ethically.82  Payment for babies or parenthood directly to
(describing destination countries where surrogacy is legal and indicating which
countries are “hubs”).
76. See X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC (Fam) 3030 (Eng.) (foreign
commercial surrogate agreement excepted despite violation of domestic prohibi-
tion due to best interests of the child); Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India &
ANR, (2008) 13 SCC 518 (India) (discussing surrogacy arrangement made by Japa-
nese couple where commercial surrogacy is banned); Henry Bodkin, Couples Paying
£60,000 for Surrogates Despite UK System of ‘Reasonable Expenses Only,’ THE TELEGRAPH
(July 2, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/07/01/
couples-paying-60000-surrogates-despite-uk-system-reasonable/ [https://
perma.cc/Z7BP-KVDF].
77. See generally Krawiec, supra note 13, at 247–50 (discussing the range of
what she terms “baby markets” including ART and adoption); see also June Car-
bone & Jody Lynee Madeira, Buyers in the Baby Market: Toward a Transparent Con-
sumerism, 91 WASH. L. REV. 72 (2016) (describing the consumer nature of ART).
78. See ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 2 (describing why people adopt,
indicating that multiple reasons are common but the need due to medical or so-
cial infertility should not be underestimated).
79. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 136 (1996) (describ-
ing the limited commerciality of adoption and the outlawing of “commissioned
adoption” as baby-sales).
80. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 344 (1978).
81. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Coping with Life, Law and Market: A Comment on
Posner and the Law-and-Economics Debate, 67 B.U. L. REV. 73, 73 (1987); Robert S.
Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 350, 354 (1984).
82. See RADIN, supra note 79, at 137–38 (“If we permit babies to be sold, we
commodify not only the mother’s (and father’s) baby-making capacities-which
14
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birthparents is prohibited worldwide.83  Birth parents cannot benefit from
adoption beyond the payment of “costs and expenses.”84  Additional regu-
lations include precluding enforcement of pre-birth agreements by giving
birth parents time after the birth to rescind any arrangements, as well as
other protections to ensure birth parents freely and willingly terminate
their parental rights.  Fathers and mothers have constitutional due process
protection in place that limits the state’s ability to terminate parental con-
nections to the child.85
Like in ART, parents must still pay agency and legal fees and expenses
to arrange for adoption, especially private adoption, the form in which
most infants are placed.86  Additionally, a certain amount of wealth and
security is necessary to be considered suitable for adoption.87  Private
adoption has more market characteristics than public adoption as it allows
birth parents to choose adoptive parents and retain greater privacy.88  Pri-
vate adoption has been criticized for being too commercial because per-
missible payments to birth parents include lost wages,89 and for failing to
might be analogous to commodifying sexuality but also the baby herself.  Com-
modifying babies leads us to conceive of potentially all personal attributes in mar-
ket rhetoric, not merely those of sexuality.  Moreover, to conceive of infants in
market rhetoric is likewise to conceive of the people they will become in market
rhetoric, and this might well create in those people a commodified self-concep-
tion.”); MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 136–39 (1993); Margaret
Jane Radin, What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Selling, 26 PAC. L.J. 135, 144–45
(1995) (address given at the McGeorge School of Law on March 4, 1994).
83. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 654
(1994); Krawiec, supra note 13, at 247–48 (“Although both international law and
the laws of all fifty states prohibit “baby selling”—the relinquishment of parental
rights in exchange for payment—few states specifically cap or otherwise restrict
permissible payments for medical, living, and other expenses of birth parents, al-
lowing some latitude to those eager to evade such restriction.”).
84. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-703 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1994) (Section 3-703 permitting only payment of reasonable expenses
to birth parents).
85. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (protecting unmarried fa-
thers who undertake parental obligations; In re Juvenile Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313
(Conn. 1983) (articulating the constitutional standard that must be met before
state interference with parental rights).
86. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value
of a Baby, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 61–64 (2006) (emphasizing the high costs
of adopting children in the U.S. and the resulting comparisons to markets in ba-
bies); Krawiec, supra note 13, at 246–48 (discussing payments to intermediaries);
David M. Smolin, Child Laundering and The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adop-
tion: The Future and Past of Intercountry Adoption, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 441,
493–94 (arguing that ICA is too close to baby-sales).
87. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-204(NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1994) (section 2-204 discussing suitability requirements for adoptive
parents).
88. See People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d
787 (N.Y. 1971) (describing the public agency adoption process and the birth par-
ents surrender of all rights to the agency during relinquishment).
89. See, e.g., Andrea B. Carroll, Re-Regulating the Baby Market: A Call for a Ban on
Payment of Birth Mother Living Expenses, 59 KANSAS L. REV. 285, 288-89 (2011) (argu-
15
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sufficiently protect the interests of children.90  However, even private
adoptions, which allow birth parents and intended parents to meet and
formulate their own contractual arrangements, are highly regulated and
monitored.  Home visits are used to determine parental suitability, courts
must approve the adoption, and birth mothers still have the right to re-
scind their agreement to transfer the parental rights after the birth.91  In
sum, adoption is a highly regulated process and it is considered deeply
important to distinguish adoption from an unethical and illegal market in
babies.  In contrast to widely-accepted ART “baby markets,” commercial
adoption is “taboo.”
While domestic adoption involves a widely-accepted system of what is
considered “non-commercial adoption,” even including private adoption,
ICA cannot seem to distance itself from the specter of impropriety and
illegal baby-sales.92  Deep concern about the ethics of ICA has been per-
sonified in some particularly famous incidents,93 reported by human
rights documents,94 and compellingly portrayed by scholars such as David
Smolin. It is argued that birth-parents are improperly and illegally receiv-
ing financial remuneration that children are being “laundered” for finan-
cial reasons by intermediaries while birth parents believe their children
ing that payment for living expenses provides too much compensation for babies
in private adoptions); Danielle Saba Donner, The Emerging Adoption Market: Child
Welfare Agencies, Private Middlemen, and “Consumer” Remedies, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. L. 473, 490 (1996); Alfred L. Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Inde-
pendent Adoption Placement, 9 FAM. L.Q. 547, 547–54 (1975); Carol S. Silverman,
Regulating Independent Adoptions, 22 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 323, 329–31 (1989);
see also David Ray Papke, Pondering Past Purposes: A Critical History of American Adop-
tion Law, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 459, 471–72 (1999) (describing private adoptions as
fast growing because they are more “consumer-driven” and “can abide by what the
client wants”); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1443, 1478–97 (1992) (explaining the shift from adoptions that promote the wel-
fare of children to the fulfillment of the desires and needs of couples who want
children).
90. Critics claim that independent adoptions sacrifice child welfare and pro-
vide insufficient counseling to the parties. See L. Jean Emery, Agency Versus Indepen-
dent Adoption: The Case for Agency Adoption, 3 FUTURE CHILDREN 139, 140–42 (1993).
However, others point to the benefits of private versus public adoptions that re-
quire relinquishment—benefits to children who do not linger in foster care, birth
parents who can be part of the process and ultimately arrange for open adoptions
and for adoptive parents who can decrease waiting times. See Mark T. McDermott,
Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Case for Independent Adoption, 3 FUTURE CHIL-
DREN, 146, 146–47 (1993).
91. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’
Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 519 (2005).
92. See JUDITH S. MODELL, A SEALED AND SECRET KINSHIP: THE CULTURE OF
POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN AMERICAN ADOPTION 147 (2002); Khabibullina, supra
note 9, at 177.
93. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
94. See ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 68–71 (describing a 2000 UN
human rights criticizing human rights abuses in ICA in Guatemala, as well as me-
dia focus on abuses).
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will only be removed temporarily.95  And, that due to desperate situations,
birth parents are incentivized to sell their children for the money it pro-
vides or have children for the money they could bring.96  The array of
concerns from financial incentives in ICA ranges from child theft, kidnap-
ping, fraudulent manipulation of mothers into giving up children, adop-
tion of children from orphanages without parental knowledge or
understanding, the selling of parental by birth parents, and falsification of
records.97  These concerns are overwhelming the discussion and feasibility
of ICA.  Ultimately, money is considered the culprit for this fraud—money
and the market are blamed for corrupting ICA and turning good inten-
tions into corrupt human rights abuses.98  Thus, in discussions of ICA, the
exchange of money for children is held directly responsible for fraud, cor-
ruption, and child laundering.
Indeed, the primary impetus for the passing of the Hague Convention
on Intercountry Adoption (Hague Convention) was to formalize and na-
tionalize the adoption process amidst the growing concern about adop-
tion abuses involving the selling and abduction of children and the overall
sense that money was corruption ICA.99  In order to eliminate such
95. See Smolin, supra note 86, at 445 (“The current decline in intercountry
adoption, and the recurrent shutdowns or slowdowns of intercountry adoption in
many sending countries, are not caused primarily by pre-existing ideological oppo-
sition to moving orphans outside of their countries of origin.  The primary prob-
lem is not ideological disagreement about intercountry adoption, but rather
regulatory failure leading to recurrent child laundering scandals and other de-
structive practices.”); see also ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 17–100 (describ-
ing at great length the extent of fraud and corruption uncovered in ICA); D.
Marianne Blair, Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry Adoption: Assessing
the Gatekeepers, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 349, 365–66 (2005) (describing misrepresenta-
tions to parents involving the creation of new identity papers for children in
India).
96. See Blair, supra note 95, at 356–64 (describing alleged inducements to
birth mothers in Cambodia and Guatemala); Melissa Long, Guatemala Passes Domes-
tic Legislation to Implement Hague Adoption Convention; But Does it Help Children?, 15
LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 631, 645–46 (2009) (describing allegations of women in-
duced by money to give up children); Johanna Oreskovic & Trish Maskew, Red
Thread or Slender Reed: Deconstructing Prof. Bartholet’s Mythology of International Adop-
tion, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71, 115 (2008).
97. See MARK MONTGOMERY & IRENE POWELL, SAVING INTERNATIONAL ADOP-
TION: AN ARGUMENT FROM ECONOMICS AND PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 114–32 (2018)
(listing the various ways trafficking and corruption claims taint international
adoption).
98. See, e.g., Bartholet & Smolin, supra note 23, at 244 (“The most fundamen-
tal problem is money . . . [referring to Guatemala] unaccounted-for funds incen-
tivized systematic child-laundering”).
99. See Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: The Human Rights Position, 1
GLOBAL POL’Y 91, 92 (2010); Asif Efrat, David Lebland, Steven Liao & Sonal S.
Pandya, Babies Across Borders: The Political Economy of International Child Abduction, 59
INT’L STUD. Q. 615, 616 (2015) (“The convention aims to increase transparency in
international adoption and reduce the risk of irregularities and abuse.”); Peter H.
Pfund, Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague Convention: Its Purpose, Implementation
and Promise, 28 FAM. L.Q. 53, 54 (1994) (“The overarching importance of the Con-
vention lies in its endorsement of intercountry adoption when there is compliance
17
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abuses, the Hague Convention prohibits any financial remuneration to
birth parents or inducements of any kind in gaining the consent to adop-
tion from birth parents, including gifts or payment in kind.100  Moreover,
it is not just payment to birth parents but payments to intermediaries that
are held up as problematic, and in South America there have been bans
on payments to intermediaries as well.101  Currently, in enforcing the
Hague Convention, the overwhelming focus in ICA is on eliminating fi-
nancial incentives to prevent the perception of uncontrollable fraud and
corruption involved in child laundering.
Why does commercialization seem to be an inevitable and uncontrol-
lable aspect of ICA, leading to bans and undermining ICA’s potential rele-
vance?  Overgeneralization is dangerous, and each country’s ICA system
has its own incentives and characteristics,102 but I will outline the connec-
tion between ICA, the fears of corruption, and commercialization in the
two historically popular sending countries—China and Guatemala.
China was one of the most significant countries of origin—some
88,000 children were adopted in the U.S. between 1992–2014.103  The
one-child only policy resulted in tens-of-thousands of abandoned female
babies who were left without the possibility of being adopted within
China.104  In China, ICA was always managed with government oversight
and involvement, and financial donations were set in advance to Chinese
residential institutions.105  Turning children over to welfare agencies was
not an option as abandonment is illegal in China like in many other juris-
dictions, especially once a child is no longer a newborn.106  Moreover, par-
with its internationally agreed minimum standards.”); David M. Smolin, Intercoun-
try Adoption and Poverty: A Human Rights Analysis, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 450–52,
494 (2007).
100. See Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption art. 1, 4(c)(3), 8, opened for signature May 29,
1993, INS 2009 WL 156573 Art. 1, 4(c)(3), 8.
101. See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text.
102. See DAPHNA HACKER, LEGALIZED FAMILIES IN THE ERA OF BORDERED
GLOBALIZATION 242–44 (2018).
103. See ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 14–15.  Families in the U.K. and
Canada have received thousands more children from China. Id. (citing Selman
2015; Dowling & Brown 2009; Johnson 2012).
104. . Evan Solomon, Finding Our Place, MACLEAN’S MAGAZINE (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=OVIC&u=vill_main&id=GALE|A434514842
&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon [Permalink unavailable].
105. The China Center for Adoption Affairs was set up in 1996 to act with
government oversight. See ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 15.
106. Id.; see also David M. Smolin, The Missing Girls of China: Population, Policy,
Culture, Gender, Abortion, Abandonment, and Adoption in East-Asian Perspective, 41
CUMB. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2010) (“Because relinquishment is not a legal option in
China, and abandonment is a crime, those who give birth and then abandon their
babies are seeking to avoid becoming legally associated with the child in any
way.”); Barbara Stark, Baby Girls from China in New York: A Thrice-Told Tale, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 1231, 1279 (2003) (“Like those mothers who abandon babies in
China, most who do so in the United States are under tremendous social pressure.
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ents could be punished by the state for having more than the maximum
number of children allotted to them or be forced to abort.107  An undocu-
mented number of parents found their only option was to abandon chil-
dren in public markets or other places where they were likely to be found
by others.108  Ultimately, children find their way to governmental institu-
tions after abandonment, but such institutions are ordinarily overwhelmed
and unable to cope with the children’s needs, resulting in the push for
ICA.109  Despite the public oversight and regulation, corruption lurked
behind the scenes.  Public institutions in China were implicated in corrup-
tion scandals for profiting from these placements.110  There were even al-
legations of child kidnapping, and that public officials would take babies
in exchange for $3,000 in lieu of fining a family for having more than one
child.111  Record-keeping in China is notoriously scarce, adding to the
cloud of corruption.112  Since its booming years, China’s improved econ-
omy, increased domestic adoptions as well as legal changes in the one-
child policy has decreased ICA dramatically; however, its influence on per-
ceptions of ICA remain significant.113  Legal and political crises such as
created the boom of ICA in China have caused swells in public adoption in
countries such as Haiti, Korea, and Vietnam, which last as long as they are
needed.
Guatemala was once the world’s most active sending country in abso-
lute numbers despite its relatively small size.114  Adoption was suspended
by moratorium in 2007 due to reports of rampant fraud, kidnapping, and
coercion.115  The ICA system was privately run in the face of overwhelm-
Unlike parents in China, however, parents in the United States may surrender an
infant for adoption without any legal impact on their future families.”).
107. See supra note 106.
108. Mary Landrieu & Whitney Reitz, How Misconceptions about International
Adoption Lead to a Violation of Human Rights against Unparented Children, 22 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 341, 351 (2014); see also Jessica L. Singer, Note, Intercountry Adop-
tion Laws: How Can China’s One-Child Policy Coincide with the 1993 Hague Convention
on Adoption, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 283, 294–96 (1998).
109. See Singer, supra note 108, at 295–96 (discussing how the overwhelming
of the government adoption system in China resulted in openness to international
adoption).
110. See Patricia J. Meier & Xiaole Zhang, Sold into Adoption: The Hunan Baby
Trafficking Scandal Exposes Vulnerabilities in Chinese Adoptions to the United States, 39
CUMB. L. REV. 87, 100–05 (2009) (discussing corruption charges in China even
when the government maintained tight oversight due to benefits accrued to social
welfare agencies).
111. See ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 16.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 15.
114. See, e.g., ROTABI & BROMFLED, supra note 9, at 65 (“At its peak, Guatemala
was estimated to be sending one child in every hundred live births abroad as an
adoptee.”) (internal citations omitted); Smolin, supra note 99, at 467–68.
115. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS NAR-
RATIVE (2015), https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/aa/pdfs/2015NarrativeAn
nualReportonIntercountryAdoptions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6REJ-BHYC] [here-
inafter DOS UPDATE] (“In December 2007, the government of Guatemala an-
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ing poverty and instability in which the public welfare system was unavaila-
ble to provide oversight.116  Often referred to as a human rights
catastrophe, the media reported rampant abuse.  Ultimately, a 2000
human rights report from described kidnapping of women and children,
adoption rings, coercion of women into pregnancy for adoption, and ex-
treme abuse.117  Others contest the scope of the abuse, arguing that it was
just as likely voluntary exchanges, and that fraud is relatively rare com-
pared to the lawful adoptions that occur.118  It is hard to quantify the ex-
tent of the abuse as adoption and the alleged abuses were all organized
privately without meaningful oversight, but the reports that have been pro-
duced are threatening.119  In Guatemala, new laws have been passed since
the signing of the Hague Convention in light of the criticism of private
adoption systems that create much stricter oversight, require registrations,
and ban any payment to private middleman or birth parents.120  But the
strict legislation and the banning of intermediaries makes the functioning
of ICA difficult, if not impossible.121  It is argued that Guatemala’s social
welfare services will not be able to process, oversee, and inspect adoptions
for all the uncared for children who need homes.122  Indeed, since the
passing of the law, Guatemala’s ICA has all but disappeared—with a low of
two adoptions in 2016 from Guatemala in the U.S.123  Because the new law
that was passed is so difficult to implement, Guatemala is struggling to
enforce its own requirements.124  Accordingly, as a result of prophylacti-
nounced a suspension of new intercountry adoption processing while it worked to
develop an adoption process compliant with the Hague Adoption Convention
(Convention) that would address vulnerabilities which led to widespread corrup-
tion and fraud under the old process.  This suspension affected all receiving coun-
tries, including the U.S. During FY 2015, Embassy Guatemala City issued only
[thirteen] immigrant visas to children adopted from Guatemala by U.S. citizens
pursuant to adoptions initiated before the ban”).
116. See ROTABI & BROMFIED, supra note 9, at 64–85.
117. Id.
118. See Bartholet & Smolin, supra note 23, at 245–46  (arguing that fears of
fraud are overstated and can be combatted without prophylactic bans); see also
MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 132.
119. See ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 68–71.
120. See, e.g., Julie Jimmerson, Note, Female Infanticide in China: An Examina-
tion of Cultural and Legal Norms, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 47, 71–75 (1990) (describ-
ing Chinese forced abortion policies).
121. See, e.g., Long, supra note 96, at 650–56 (describing the new law which
mandates the creation of a centralized governmental adoption authority and pro-
hibits all profit to birth parents and institutions or agencies acting as middlemen
in adoption).
122. Id. at 656.  The U.S. is currently not processing any adoptions from Gua-
temala because Guatemala is still trying to implement its domestic laws restricting
and regulation the adoption process. Id. at 648–53.
123. See William Robert Johnston, Historical Statistics on Adoption in the United
States, Plus Statistics on Child Population and Welfare, http://www.johnstonsarchive.
net/policy/adoptionstats.html [https://perma.cc/F2KN-X5BB] (last updated
Aug. 5, 2017).
124. See Long, supra note 96, at 650–56.
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cally trying to avoid any corruption by eliminating financial rewards even
to intermediaries, as opposed to trying to uproot individual cases of fraud
and abuse, the adoption system is simply not functioning.125
Since its signing, the adoption processes in many sending countries
who are signatories of the Convention have been found guilty of financial
“corruption” involving payments to birth families, causing much concern,
delays, and the temporary or permanent shutting down of adoption pro-
grams as countries try to fix corruption problems and strengthen over-
sight.126  Financial abuses have repeatedly led to bans on adoption and
private intermediaries throughout Central and South America.127 Indeed,
virtually every sending country—Cambodia, China, Ethiopia, Guatemala,
and Vietnam, among others—has had problems with scandals.128  The
most recent State Department figures show that the number of foreign
children adopted by U.S. parents declined 9% in 2014 bringing the num-
ber to the lowest in thirty years—there were only 6,441 adoptions in the
U.S., 74% lower than the peak of 22,884 international adoptions in
2004.129  It is clear that oversight and formalization of the process has un-
earthed a constant fear of corruption.  Once governed by private, gray-
market brokers and agencies, the national governmental oversight was
125. See Bartholet, The Child’s Story, supra note 30, at 342 (describing how bans
on profit taking by private adoption intermediaries caused the international adop-
tion system to ground to a halt in many sending countries); Home Alone, ECONO-
MIST, Aug. 6, 2016, https://www.economist.com/news/international/21703364-
fewer-families-are-adopting-children-overseas-home-alone [https://perma.cc/
4J3B-36AN].
126. See, e.g., Rachel J. Wechsler, Giving Every Child a Chance: The Need for Re-
form & Infrastructure in Intercountry Adoption Policy, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 34
(2010) (“As a result of corruption problems, seventeen of the forty sending coun-
tries from which Americans adopt have instituted temporary or permanent
moratoriums on private adoptions of their orphans.”); DOS UPDATE, supra note
115.
127.  KERRY O’HALLORAN, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION: INTERNATIONAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 793–811 (3d ed. 2015).
128. See, e.g., Judith L. Gibbons & Karen Smith Rotabi, Fraud in Intercountry
Adoption: Child Sales and Abduction in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Guatemala, in IN-
TERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: POLICIES, PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES 67, 70 (Lucy Jordan &
Patrick O’Leary eds., 2012); Smolin, supra note 86, at 467-468, passim (discussing
corruption allegations and scandals in Guatemala and many other sending coun-
tries throughout the article); Smolin, supra note 106, at 59–61; Kathryn Joyce &
Micahel Tsegaye, “Child Harvesting” in Ethiopia’s Adoption Program, PULITZER CTR.
(Jan. 5, 2012), https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/child-harvesting-ethiopias-
adoption-program [https://perma.cc/HHJ6-X9ZB].
129. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Intergenerational Justice for Children: Restructuring
Adoption, Reproduction and Child Welfare Policy, 81 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 103
(2014) (discussing consistent and significant decreases in the number of adoptions
taking place over the last decade); Janice Rodden, International Adoption in 2014 at
Lowest Level Since 1982, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.adoptive
families.com/resources/adoption-news/international-adoption-2014/ [https://
perma.cc/3TNX-9DEZ].
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supposed to cure abuses and support international cooperation.130  How-
ever, to some extent, the Convention has caused dramatic reductions in
the number of adoptions by making receiving countries much more cau-
tious about corruptions and scandals, suspending arrangements prophy-
lactically, and creating more bureaucratic hurdles to finalizing
adoptions.131  Although it is difficult to prove causation, and other factors
may also be at play in decreasing ICA,132 the greater oversight and formal-
ization of the process provided by the Hague Convention has had an im-
pact.133  Despite attempts to root out corruption, kidnapping, and illegal
130. See Hague Convention, supra note 100, at art. 1 (“(a) to ensure that in-
tercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child . . .; (b) to estab-
lish a system of co-operation amongst Contracting States to ensure that those
safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic
in children; (c) to secure the recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made
in accordance with the Convention.”); see also William Duncan, The Hague Conven-
tion on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: Its Birth
and Prospects, in INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: DEVELOPMENTS, TRENDS, AND PERSPEC-
TIVES 40, 46–47 (Peter Selman ed., 2000) (Hague convention as intended to re-
duce the delays, complications, and costs of adoption); Caeli Elizabeth Kimball,
Barriers to the Successful Implementation of the Hague Convention on Protection of Children
and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 561,
569 (2005); O’Keeffe, supra note 24, at 1615 (discussing the bureaucracy that the
Hague Convention imposes that increases costs, delays and time).
131. See Lynn D. Wardle & Travis Robertson, Adoption: Upside Down and Side-
ways; Some Causes of and Remedies for Declining Domestic and International Adoptions, 26
REGENT U. L. REV. 209, 224–26, 256 & n.328 (2014) (noting some factors contrib-
uting to the decline, including the Hague Convention, the increase in the availa-
bility and effectiveness of assisted reproductive technologies, and the restrictions
preventing LGBT parents from adopting internationally); see also Glenn Cohen &
Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing
IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and Should it Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 547 (2010);
Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Specter, Review of the Year 2015-2016 in Family Law:
Domestic Dockets Stay Busy, 50 FAM. L.Q. 501, 514 (2017) (“International adoptions
have declined partly because of the Hague Convention on Cooperation with Re-
spect to International Adoption and because several countries, including Russia,
Romania, and Guatemala, have ended adoption programs or have diminished
numbers of children available.”); Paige Tackett, “I Get By With A Little Help From My
Friends”: Why Global Cooperation Is Necessary to Minimize Child Abduction and Traffick-
ing in the Wake of Natural Disaster, 79 UMKC L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2011) (“[T]he
requisite costs [of complying with the Hague Convention] have been astronomi-
cal . . . . Compliance with the Hague Convention is expensive and time
consuming . . . .”).
132. See BARTHOLET, supra note 15, at 24, 28, 34–37 (discussing societal bias
for biological children over adoption and the difficulties of adopting after seeking
infertility treatments); Gulcin Gumus & Jungmin Lee, Alternative Paths to
Parenthood: IVF or Child Adoption, 50 ECON. INQUIRY 802, 803–04 (2012) (discussing
the impact of ART on adoption); see also Susan Frelich Appelton, Adoption in the
Age of Reproductive Technology, 2004 U. CHI. LEG. F. 393, 408 (2004); Smolin, supra
note 86, at 494 (“The declines in these key sending nations are not due primarily
to the Hague Convention, but have arisen because of developments within those
nations.”).
133. See O’HALLORAN, supra note 127, at 253–64 (“Since ratification of The
Hague Convention, intercountry adoption in Ireland has declined significantly—
though the extent to which this is a causal factor is debated.”).
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payments to birth parents, these efforts have had limited success and the
fear of the improper gray market in ICA persists.134
Ultimately, aversion toward and the potential for corruption in the
exchange of money for babies in resource-starved countries has made ICA
largely unworkable.  As both the examples of Guatemala and China
demonstrate, unlawful “corrupt” payments grease the levers of private and
public systems.  Prophylactic attempts to prevent money from changing
hands, between birth parents or agents, have made ICA slow, bureaucratic,
and impractical causing ICA systems to cease to function.135  Reforms
often result in more expensive adoptions with money being spent on the
process as opposed to helping children in need.136
The fact that money is being exchanged for children and that a price
is paid to birth parents undermines ICA because of “commodification anx-
iety”—anxiety about allowing the market to determine the value of our
lives or our intimate interactions in society.137
If a whole person, or some subset of that person integral to the nature
of personhood, is sold in the market or referred to in market terms we
potentially inflict harm, not just on that person, but we diminish the
preciousness of human life and human flourishing generally.138  As one
scholar puts it, “[w]e potentially do harm to ourselves and to human flour-
ishing if we treat something integral to ourselves as a commodity, i.e., as
separate and fungible.”139  The market is a cold and arms-length medium
134. See supra note 24; see also Landrieu & Reitz, supra note 108, at 350; Katie
Rasor, Richard M. Rothblatt, Elizabeth A. Russo & Julie A. Turner, Imperfect Reme-
dies: The Arsenal of Criminal Status Available to Prosecute International Adoption Fraud in
the United States, 55 N.Y. SCH. L. REV. 801, 801–22 (2010) (exploring the various
regulations that can be invoked to prosecute adoption fraud).
135. See, e.g., Taemin Kang, Breaking the Myths of Intercountry Adoption in
Romania, 10 REGENT J. INT’L L. 131, 137–38 (2014) (fears of corruption resulted in
ban on intercountry adoption in Romania); Long, supra note 96, at 651–65 (fears
of corruption leads to new legislation whose troubled implementation has resulted
in a near complete halt to intercountry adoption in Guatemala); I. Willing, P. Fro-
nek & D. Cuthbert, Review of Sociological Literature on Intercountry Adoption, 11 SOC.
POL’Y & SOC’Y 465, 465–79 (2012) (arguing that Hague Convention and bans on
international adoption reflect a bias for Western concerns).
136. See Carlson, supra note 24, at 766.
137. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 118 (2000) (describing the term “commodification
anxiety” as referring to the unease people feel with measuring human lives and
intimate connections in market terms particular in the context of providing remu-
neration to women’s domestic labor); Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the Master’s
Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745, 750–51 (2000) (describing the term “commodification
anxiety” coined by Joan Williams as essential to reconceiving the relationship be-
tween women and financial power.); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead—Beyond a New
Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2282 (1994).
138. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also Sonia M. Suter, Giving
in to Baby Markets: Regulation Without Prohibition, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 222,
234–35 (2009); Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Com-
modification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 693 (2003).
139. Suter, supra note 138, at 222; see also Radin, supra note 20, at 1930–36.
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and does not take into account the pricelessness of human life or the per-
sonal nature of emotions and attachments.140
Indeed, the commodification anxiety creates a domino effect creating
fears and rumors of the worst kind—that children sent to ICA are being
traded for their organs.  In Russia for instance, the media circulated con-
cerns that children in illegal adoptions were sold to pedophiles or used for
transplantation operations to profit an untraceable intermediary named
Nadezhda Fratti.141  Such persistent rumors also circulated in Brazil in the
1980s, and in Central America and Africa.142  In fact, these were specula-
tive rumors that conflated stories of corruption in ICA and organ mar-
kets143  Despite the failure of investigations to find such extreme
improprieties, the specter of the rich taking the babies of the poor created
fear and animosity towards the global transfer of children from poor to
wealthy countries in exchange for money.
With so much potential for and difficulty in policing corruption, it
has been argued that ICA should cease altogether, reflecting what is per-
ceived as a corrupt and fraudulent reality.144  Beyond corruption, there
are other critiques undermining intercountry adoption.  Given that adop-
tion occurs between wealthy and poor countries, ICA is plagued by con-
cerns that it is the new “colonialism,” a means of exploiting the resources
of poor countries in favor of the rich ones.145  Racial concerns are ex-
pressed due to the reality that in ICA Black, Hispanic, and other minority
children are often transferred to primarily wealthy, white parents.146
Many argue that ICA deprives children of their rights to cultural affiliation
and identities.147  Critics argue that children adopted internationally have
140. See, e.g., Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of Property Law
and Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167, 1242–46 (1995); JOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, PRACTICES AND POLICIES 1289 (1993) (“Market rhet-
oric is extremely useful, but it may be inappropriate in some cases.”); Jane B.
Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic
Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431, 463 (1995) (noting the potential
inappropriateness of discussing human bodies in market terms).
141. Khabibullina, supra note 9, at 181.
142. Id. at 181–82.
143. Id. at 182.
144. See, e.g., ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 155–59; see also Smolin,
supra note 14.
145. See, e.g., King, supra note 31, at 426.
146. See id.; ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 2 (“An international adop-
tion is most commonly completed by middle- and upper-class families, most often
by prospective parents who are predominantly White and have completed  a uni-
versity education.”); Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian Adoption: In the
Best Interests of the Child?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 343, 349–50 (2004).
147. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Dec.
12, 1989) [hereinafter CRC]; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978); Barbara Bennett Wood-
house, The Family-Supportive Nature of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, in
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF
TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 37–49 (Jonathan
Todres et al. eds., 2006); King, supra note 31, at 453–54.
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difficulties adjusting to their new cultures and making peace with their
mixed identities.148  There are those that argue that money is better spent
providing aid to families in need than in paying to raise their own
children.149
III. A SYNCRETIC ANALYSIS OF ART AND ADOPTION AS TWO FORMS OF
COMMERCIAL COLLABORATIVE FAMILY-MAKING
What I have described is a functional, and largely unregulated, system
of baby markets in ART, including collaborative forms of ART, and even a
strong system of international commercial surrogacy alongside a failing
and disappearing system of intercountry adoption.150  Marketization is
perceived as inevitably fraudulent and corrupting in ICA while it is largely
accepted in the context of collaborative ART, even international surro-
gacy.  In the next section, I consider whether this juxtaposition—the baby
markets dilemma—can be justified in light of legal and ethical considera-
tions, historical analysis, and empirical studies.
A. Justifying the Difference
One way to justify the difference in legal treatment between commer-
cialized ART “baby markets” and marketized adoption is that, due to mod-
ern definitions of legal parenthood, markets in gametes and surrogacy do
not sell parenthood in the same manner as commercialized adoptions.
For instance, in the context of gamete purchases, factors other than genet-
ics are used to define parenthood.151  In cases of third-party sperm
purchases, marital presumptions or intent can be used to define father-
hood.152  And, in cases of egg purchases, birth or intent is regularly used
148. See Perry, supra note 31, at 135; King, supra note 31, at 425 (“Whether the
exchange is viewed as one between birth parents with very few resources, and fami-
lies with resources, or as one between a country with an extensive (admittedly im-
perfect) social service infrastructure and a country with no social service
infrastructure, the exchange bears a neo-colonialist hue.”); Ryiah Lilth, Note, Buy-
ing a Wife But Saving a Child: A Deconstruction of Popular Rhetoric and Legal Analysis of
Mail-Order Brides and Intercountry Adoptions, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 225, 229, 258–59,
262 (2001).
149. Bergquist, supra note 146, at 349; King, supra note 31, at 425.
150. See generally ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9 (describing at length how
ICA is failing while global surrogacy is on the rise).  I have also described the
booming market in fertility services and gamete sales.  However, in this Article I
will focus on surrogacy and international surrogacy as these forms of ART involve
the greatest investment by family-making collaborators in terms of time and physi-
cal involvement.  However, gamete sellers are also collaborative family-law partici-
pants and their role and their need for recognition has been discussed at length.
See Cahn, supra note 1.
151. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and The Threat to the
Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 963–64 (1996) (discussing how the use of
intent to define parenthood creates a contract private ordering around
parenthood challenging traditional biology-based norms).
152. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 2008) (“If, under the supervi-
sion of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is insemi-
25
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to define parenthood.153  In this way, legal definitions of parenthood
make gamete sales about buying human tissue, but not about buying legal
rights to a child.
Indeed, in jurisdictions where commercial surrogacy is permitted,
parenthood is often defined by intent.154  Thereby, although intended
parents purchase gestational services, parenthood rights are not trans-
ferred for money as the surrogate is not the legal mother.  Because surro-
gates and other collaborators are defined as legal strangers, it is simpler to
allow them to be paid in the market unlike birth parents in adoption
whose biological parenthood cannot be questioned and, thus, the specter
of baby-selling arises.155  Moreover, in the majority of surrogacy arrange-
ments worldwide, there is a genetic connection between the baby born to
at least one of the two intended parents, if not both, providing a biological
connection between intended parents and the child as well.156  As the in-
tended parents are defined as the natural parents of the child born in
surrogacy,157 the state is more inclined to allow the markets based on cau-
tion in getting involved with private parental relationships.158
In addition, in adoption, parental rights are transferred to a child that
already exists.  The market, it is argued, does not sufficiently account for
nated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is
treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”).
153. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 676 (Cal. 2005) (egg donor consent
form relinquishes parenthood rights of donor); Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic
Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 265, 281 (1995) (describing intent based parenthood in egg donation).
154. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P. 2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
155. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Reproduction Reconceived, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 617, 651–53 (2016) (discussing how separating gamete donors from
parenthood can be explained be intimacy essentialism and the desire to keep the
market and parenthood in separate spheres).
156. See, e.g., IVF Australia, Surrogacy: IVF Australia’s Guide to Preparing for Surro-
gacy (2018) 4, 6, https://www.ivf.com.au/sites/default/files/leaflets/vh-mkt-cln-
010-nsw_surrogacy_4-8june18.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4YF-J8LM] (limiting surro-
gacy to gestation of children with genetic connections to both the intended
mother and father); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1)(e) (West 1997) (requirement of
genetic connection); SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS: A CULTURAL AC-
COUNT OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION IN ISRAEL 188–96 (2000) (discussing Embryo Car-
rying Agreements Law of 1996); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Collaborative Reproduction
and Rethinking Parentage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 43, 54 (2008) (“Over the
past two decades, there has been an increased use of surrogacy arrangements
whereby one woman agrees to carry the fetus of another couple. Most of these
situations involve gestational surrogacy in which the surrogate is the birth mother
but has no genetic connection to the child.”); Scott, supra note 5, at 121
(“[G]estational surrogacy, in which a pre-embryo is implanted in the surrogate,
has largely replaced traditional surrogacy, in which the pregnancy results from
artificial insemination of the surrogate’s own egg.”).
157. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 778.
158. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that “the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling [parents] to
cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16” when such a practice
would burden the free exercise of religion).
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the interests of children.159  The state has an obligation to be involved and
ensure that child’s safety.  On the other hand, in ART markets, the child is
created by the market, and, thus, it is unclear if the government needs to
regulate ART for the sake of children who are not yet born.  I. Glenn
Cohen, for instance, argues that it cannot be in the best interests of chil-
dren to prohibit or restrict access to ART because these children would
otherwise not be born at all.160  Thus, implicating Parfit’s so-called “non-
identity” problem, he claims it cannot be argued that children are better
off not having been born at all, or that it would be in their best interests to
restrict the ART from which they were conceived because then they would
not have been born.161  However, the state does have a duty to ensure
basic rights for children once they are born, and thus, legislation may be
necessary to regulate ART pre-birth, for instance by mandating record
keeping to secure access to genetic identity.162
These two differences between ART and adoption are significant and
can justify differences in legal treatment.  Accordingly, while some argue
that commercial surrogacy constitutes baby-selling in a manner parallel to
adoption,163 there are legally and conceptually at least two significant rea-
sons to differentiate legal treatment of ART markets and commercialized
adoption.164
B. Parallels May Overwhelm Similarities
On the other hand, ART markets and commercial adoption share
many similarities, and there is good reason to hold them to similar stan-
dards of regulation and even to allow similar levels of commerciality.
These similarities stem from the reality that collaborative ART and adop-
tion are two means of procuring children for those who are unable to have
children without third-party collaborators.  However, as I describe in this
part, these similarities move beyond this common starting point and re-
flect systematic symmetry, especially in the context of commercial surro-
gacy, where the intimate nature of the engagement makes corruption
concerns particularly compelling.  The similarities and shared attributes
should make us question the striking lack of symmetry between the legal
159. See supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text (discussing the ethical
objections to baby-selling).
160. See I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests,
96 MINN. L. REV. 423, 454–55 (2011).
161. Id.
162. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Lost Children: When the Rights to Children
Conflict with the Rights of Children, 8 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 219, 219–25 (2014)
(discussing the limits of the non-identity theory in the context of children who will
one day be rights bearers).
163. See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 14, at 311.
164. For discussion comparing surrogacy and adoption, see ROTABI &
BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 121; HACKER, supra note 102, at 241 (comparing the
commodification in adoption to the commodification in surrogacy); Krawiec, supra
note 13, at 246–50 (arguing that both are examples of baby markets).
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acceptance of collaborative ART markets and its refusal to accept commer-
cialization in ICA.
1. Commodification and Exploitation in Surrogacy
As described above, commercial adoption is anathema due to the fear
that birth parents will be exploited by being pressured to sell their babies
and, more generally, that the marketization and commodification of chil-
dren fails to value the pricelessness of humanity or protect individual chil-
dren from harm and trafficking.165  Commodification anxiety, particularly
in the context of global transfers of children, creates unease and justifies
significant bureaucratic and legal hurdles to prevent commercialization of
the process.166
However, similar concerns about commodification and exploitation
surround surrogate motherhood.  Many have made essentialist and theo-
retical arguments about the harms of commodification in surrogate moth-
erhood including the commodification of the woman’s body,167 the
cheapening of the value of parenthood and child-making,168 the inability
to give fully informed consent,169 and the exploitative nature of the surro-
gate contract.170  These kinds of arguments are comparable to concerns
about baby-selling in ICA.
In addition, empirical studies and lessons from decades of surrogate
motherhood practice demonstrate real harms from these arrangements to
surrogate women, especially in international surrogacy.  Surrogacy in-
volves long-term relationships, physical control and restraint, and biologi-
165. See supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 20, at 1930–36; Smolin, supra note 14, at 334.
168. MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MAT-
TERS MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND
SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS 113 (2001); Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor
a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 75 (1990).
169. See, e.g., MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND
HUMAN ISSUES 27 (1990) (arguing that “to portray surrogacy contracts as represent-
ing meaningful choice and informed consent on the part of the contracting surro-
gate mother, rather than to see her as driven by circumstances. . . [fails] to take
account of realities.”); Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Femi-
nists, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 167, 172 (Larry Gostin
ed., 1990); Rosemary Tong, The Overdue Death of a Feminist Chameleon: Taking a
Stand on Surrogacy Arrangements, 21 J. SOC. PHIL. 40, 45 (1990) (“To say that a wo-
man ‘chooses’ to do this . . . is simply to say that when a woman is forced to choose
between poverty and exploitation, she sometimes chooses exploitation as the lesser
of two evils.”); see also In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128, 1149 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987) (“Counsel for the Whiteheads says that until Mrs. Whitehead felt the emo-
tion of birth and sensed the child, she could not give informed consent at the time
she signed the contract.”).
170. See, e.g., Ruth Macklin, Is There Anything Wrong with Surrogate Motherhood:
An Ethical Analysis, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 136, 141–42
(Larry Gostin ed., 1990); CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION:
A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 118, 124–26 (1987).
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cal exchanges with embryos that create a personal intimacy among
surrogate, embryo, and intended parents that is not regularly commodi-
fied.171  Intended parents are involved in the surrogate’s physical health,
decision-making, and her everyday activities in an atypical manner given
their concern for the child she is carrying.  The intended couples often
accompany surrogates to doctors’ appointments and have interests in her
actions, what she consumes, and where she travels.172  Indeed, surrogate
contracts may assert control over the lives of surrogates while they ges-
tate—contracts may prevent surrogates from international travel or partic-
ipation in high impact sports or cigarette smoking, or they may require
certain actions and encumber surrogates’ freedom generally.173  From the
time a pregnancy is initiated, surrogates are literally trapped, physically,
into their agreements and into their entangled relationship with inten-
tional parents despite changes of heart, disputes, or unexpected suffering.
The nature of this relational bond and the dangers it poses are appar-
ent in the context of medical decision-making during surrogacy.174  It is
questionable whether the right to informed consent to medical treatment,
a right that protects human dignity and must be exercised at the time of
treatment, can withstand the surrogacy agreement which fundamentally
constrains and commits the surrogate to “reasonable” medical treatment
and procedures in advance.175  In fact, provisions of surrogacy contracts
may involve agreeing to abort under pre-determined conditions, although
the enforceability of such provisions is questionable.176
171. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1236–38 (discussing the intimacy involved
in surrogacy).
172. See, e.g., Morgan Holcomb & Mary Patricia Byrn, When Your Body Is Your
Business, 85 WASH. L. REV. 647, 657 (2010) (“Provisions such as the specifics of the
IVF treatment, prenatal care, and whether the intended parents can attend medi-
cal appointments are incorporated into the contract to reinforce that, while the
surrogate may be the one carrying the child, it is not her pregnancy.  From the
parties’ perspectives, the pregnancy belongs to the intended parents and the surro-
gate is hired to provide a valuable service.”) (citations omitted).
173. See, e.g., Kimberly R. Willoughby & Alisa A. Campbell, Having My Baby:
Surrogacy in Colorado, COLO. LAW., Jan. 31, 2002, at 103, 105–06 (itemizing the kind
of restrictions found in surrogacy contracts).
174. See generally Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Disembodied Womb: Pregnancy, In-
formed Consent and Surrogate Motherhood, 43 N.C. J. INT’L L. 96 (2018).
175. Id. at 104–05 (describing the problems of contractually waiving the right
of informed consent in surrogate contracts); see also Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Waiv-
ing Informed Consent to Prenatal Screening and Diagnosis? Problems with Paradoxical Ne-
gotiation in Surrogacy Contracts, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 559, 559 (2011)
(“[A]dditional interested parties—the intended parents—are involved in the med-
ical decision-making relationship.”).
176. Holcomb & Byrn, supra note 172, at 657 n.42 (“Many surrogacy contracts
incorporate provisions related to abortion and fetal reduction.  The surrogate has
a constitutional right to have an abortion; however, in many instances the parties
to a surrogacy contract may insert a provision into the contract requiring that the
surrogate waive her right to an abortion or stating that an abortion must be per-
formed in certain circumstances.”).
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The nature of the surrogate motherhood process involves surrogates
and intended parents experiencing the pregnancy and labor together and
becoming emotionally and intimately involved in each other’s daily lives
and relationships.177  Researchers have described the relationship as more
than just a “commonplace friendship” but rather a relationship deeply in-
tertwined with the welfare of the child and based on the intimate physical
nature of the pregnancy.178  Surrogates expect this relationship to con-
tinue through the pregnancy and after birth.179  It is the quality of the
relationship between the surrogate and intended parent that largely deter-
mines her satisfaction with the process.180  However, when surrogates feel
that the intended parents are distant, and that the level of relationship did
not meet their expectations, the surrogates are likely to express dissatisfac-
tion.181  Even if the relationship was good during the pregnancy but then
tapers off after the birth the surrogate’s satisfaction with the whole process
drops dramatically.182  When relationships do not exist, in contrast to a
surrogate’s expectations, surrogacy too often results in devastation for the
surrogate, revealing a darker side where parties feel abused and dehuman-
ized—precisely the harms that commodification of intimacy threatens.183
While relationships that harbor vulnerability and intimacy in surro-
gacy usually exist domestically, and most domestic surrogates are ulti-
mately satisfied with the process,184 international surrogacy involves far
177. See ELLY TEMAN, BIRTHING A MOTHER: THE SURROGATE BODY AND THE
PREGNANT SELF 205–29 (2010); Hazel Baslington, The Social Organization of Surro-
gacy: Relinquishing a Baby and the Role of Payment in the Psychological Detachment Pro-
cess, 7 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 57, 58, 64–67 (describing his thesis of “maternal-fetal
detachment” during commercial surrogacy and noting the strong relationships de-
veloped with infertile couples using the concept of “defection”); Melinda M.
Hohman & Christina B. Hagan, Satisfaction with Surrogate Mothering: A Relational
Model, 4 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 61, 67–69, 81–82 (2002); Helena Ragone´, Chas-
ing the Blood Tie: Surrogate Mothers, Adoptive Mothers and Fathers, 23 AM. ETHNOLOGIST
352, 359–62 (1996).
178. R.J. Edelmann, Surrogacy: The Psychological Issues, 22 J. REPROD. & INFANT
PSYCHOL. 123, 125, 129 (2004).
179. TEMAN, supra note 177, at 36l; Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman,
Navigating Rough Waters: An Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC.
ISSUES 21, 31–32 (2005); Hohman & Hagan, supra note 177, at 67–69.
180. TEMAN supra note 177, at 215–25; Baslington, supra note 177, at 65–67;
Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 179, at 22–24 (reporting twenty-seven empirical
studies from January 1983-December 2003); J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern,
The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 345, 358–59 (2011); Hohman & Hagan,
supra note 177 at 67–69, 81–82.
181. TEMAN, supra note 177, at 205–21; Hohman & Hagan, supra note 177, at
67–69.
182.  TEMAN, supra note 177, at 225–29; Ciccarelli & Beckman, supra note 179,
at 32.
183.  D. KELLY WEISBERG, THE BIRTH OF SURROGACY IN ISRAEL 193 (Univ. Press
of Fla. 2005).
184. Scott, supra note 5, at 137–44 (discussing the satisfaction and success at-
tributed to commercial surrogacy as well as the way surrogacy has been accepted in
contemporary society).
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greater potential for exploitation and commodification.185  Although sur-
rogates often still imagine they are connected to intended parents in a
manner similar to local surrogates, as they are still humans who are in-
volved in deeply intimate and involved processes, this is more illusion than
reality.186  Unlike domestic surrogacy, empirical accounts do not attest to
warm ongoing relations between surrogates and intended parents—in
fact, they usually do not even meet.187  Rather, the process is much more
dehumanized, with babies removed immediately from surrogates, birth
processes being almost exclusively by C-section, and surrogates being
monitored and controlled much more closely.188  International surrogacy,
unlike domestic surrogacy, is usually not a joint collaborative family-mak-
ing process but a mechanized ordering process.189  Moreover, in interna-
tional surrogacy, the western standard of informed consent is unlikely to
apply.190  When there is no relationship between the surrogate and in-
tended parents, she is more likely to be expected to put her own health in
danger for the sake of the fetus, be subject to coercive medical treatment
like abortions, and be subject to degrading restrictions during pregnancy
for the sake of the baby she carries.191  For example, in international sur-
rogacy, surrogates have related how, in cases of multiple fetal pregnancies,
the doctors do not expressly seek their permission before carrying out fe-
tal reductions.192  In addition, the high sums paid to foreign surrogates,
who are empirically more destitute and less educated than surrogates in
domestic surrogacy, threaten to exploit her poverty where few, if any, alter-
185. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1265–75.
186. Pande, supra note 1, at 622 (describing how many foreign surrogates em-
phasize their global sisterly ties with commissioning couples, insisting that they will
continue to stay in constant contact after the birth and even that the intended
parents were likely to pay for the surrogate’s children’s educational expenses di-
rectly out of familial love).
187. Id.; Parks, supra note 72, at 335.
188. See Scott Carney, Inside India’s Rent-a-Womb Business, MOTHER JONES,
Mar./Apr. 2010, at 68, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/04/surro-
gacy-tourism-india-nayna-patel/ [https://perma.cc/7A9H-ZR8B]; ROTABI &
BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 147 (noting automatic use of C-sections in foreign
surrogacy in India).
189. Pande, supra note 1, at 622; AMRITA PANDE, WOMBS IN LABOR: TRANSNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY IN INDIA 68 (2014) (“The surrogate is expected to
be a disciplined contract worker who will give the baby away immediately after
delivery without creating a fuss.”).
190. Choudhury, supra note 65, at 49 (discussing ways to improve Indian in-
formed consent); Amy Parker, Reproductive Labor or Trafficking: The Effect of Disparate
Power on Consent in Transnational Surrogacy Agreements, 25 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y
155, 169 (2015-2016) (discussing lack of informed consent in Indian surrogacy
contracts); Jennifer Rimm, Booming Baby Business: Regulating Commercial Surrogacy in
India, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1429, 1459–61 (2009); Richard F. Storrow, Quests for
Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L. J.
295, 309 (2005).
191. SPAR, supra note 1, at 94.
192. Diksha Munjal-Shankar, Autonomy, Choices and Consent in Commercial Sur-
rogacy: Viewing through the Indian Lens, 7 ASIAN BIOETHICS REV. 380, 385 (2015).
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nate options exist for securing needed income.193  In sum, international
surrogates are particularly vulnerable to being commodified by being
treated as mechanical incubators without rights, interests, and personal
entanglements, as well as exploited for their destitute conditions.  We
should be just as uncomfortable commodifying women as we are com-
modifying birth parents and children, although the different legal treat-
ment attests to the greater discomfort in commodifying parenthood.
2. Domestic Adoption is Already Commodified
In addition to the potential harms of commodification and exploita-
tion that already exist in surrogacy, it is also worth noting that adoption is
explicitly commodified domestically in ways that are largely accepted.
First, for children who are difficult to place for adoption, either due to
their age or due to their special needs, the government provides public
subsidies to adoptive parents to ease the adoption process.194  Despite the
explicit commerciality of the process, the fear of corruption is low.  The
amount of the subsidies is insufficient to incentivize permanent adoption
and responsibility for a child.  Finally, the state would have to make these
expenditures to foster parents or group homes, in any event, and thus
paying the money to permanent parents helps both children in need of
stability, parents in need of income, and the overstretched welfare system
who obtains a permanent caregiver for children.195  In fact, the lack of
money is considered an invalid reason to prevent special needs adop-
tions.196  Despite overt commerciality, this program is widely accepted and
has achieved some success with an uptick in adoptions.197
193. Smerdon, supra note 73, at 54; PANDE, supra note 189, at 60 (money
earned through surrogacy is equivalent to almost five years of total family in-
come.); Anne Donchin, Reproductive Tourism and the Quest for Global Gender Justice,
24 BIOETHICS 323, 326 (2010) (“[P]overty induces people to resort to work that
separates them from their families or jeopardizes their health.”); Ryznar, supra
note 65, at 167.
194. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
94 Stat. 500.  Every state now has a state subsidy program with federal and state
funds available for those who adopt special needs children.  Generally, a special
needs child is one that is eligible for adoption and the state has determined, after
making reasonable efforts to place the child, that the child will not be placed with-
out a subsidy. See 42 U.S.C. § 673(c) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 673 (1980).  Congress has
legislated financial incentives for the states in order to increase such adoptions.
See 42 U.S.C. § 673b (2009) (amended AFSA provision).
195. Dawn J. Post, Adoption Bonuses and Broken Adoptions, 33 CHILD L. PRAC. 9
(2014) (discussing how adoption payments help the adoption system for special
needs children).
196. See, e.g., W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bringing Up Baby:
Adoption, Marriage, and the Best Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 883,
904–05 (2006).
197. Paul Placek, National Adoption Data, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK IV 3, 28–29
(National Council for Adoption 2007), https://www.adoptioncouncil.org/files/
large/c3dfa7b8619e8aa [https://perma.cc/A2HS-LEC6] (60% in 2002, up from
48.5% in 1996).
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Second, private adoptions, through which most newborn babies are
placed in the U.S., also have overtly commercial aspects.198  Private adop-
tions are popular because birth mothers retain more control of the pro-
cess, are able to select adoptive parents, and set the terms of the adoption,
including agreements for continuing contact.199  Adoptive parents pay
large fees to agencies and lawyers to obtain legal custody, and the birth
mother can also benefit financially to some extent as she can receive pay-
ment for expenses, including lost wages.200  Private ordering coupled with
payments for lost wages and high agency fees give private adoption a free
market commercial feel.
3. History of Adoption Demonstrates It Has Always Been a Commercial
Undertaking
Furthermore, historical accounts of domestic adoption demonstrate
that commerciality has always been a fundamental part of legal adop-
tion.201  Financial benefit was an explicit and accepted incentive in early
legal-adoption systems.202  While social workers sought to place children
in foster and adoptive homes due to charitable incentives, the benefits of
useful children were explicitly used to lure foster and adoptive parents to
providing homes for children in need due to poverty, neglect, or abuse.203
Moreover, although adoption statutes and parental consents relinquished
children to charitable organizations authorizing permanent placement
with adoptive families, as adoption was largely driven by poverty, birth fam-
ilies regularly viewed placement of children as a temporary measure to
provide children with a better life, training, food, and lodging.204
198. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 86, at 62 (emphasizing the high costs of
adopting children in the U.S. and the resulting comparisons to markets in babies).
199. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Price and Pretense in the Baby Market, in Baby Mar-
kets: Money, Morals, and The Neopolitics of Choice 41, 55–60 (2009).
200. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 86, at 64–69 (describing overall fees paid to
middlemen and birth parents); Krawiec, supra note 13, at 246–49 (discussing pay-
ments to intermediaries); Carroll, supra note 89, at 288–89 (discussing the living
expense fees that she argues turns domestic adoption into improper commodifica-
tion of babies); Danielle Saba Donner, The Emerging Adoption Market: Child Welfare
Agencies, Private Middlemen, and “Consumer” Remedies, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L.
473, 490–91 (1996).
201. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL
VALUE OF CHILDREN 172–99 (1985) (discussing the transition from the desirability
of useful children who worked to sentimental useless children and the monetary
incentives needed to place unwanted children).
202. Id. at 172–73 (“The most renowned nineteenth-century program of plac-
ing children in family homes was directly contingent on children’s economic
usefulness.”).
203. Id. at 173–74 (“The plight of nineteenth century babies was the flip side
of children’s usefulness.”); Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52
DUKE L.J. 1077, 1092–93 (2003).
204. Cahn, supra note 203, at 1092–93 (describing how foster placements
even where parents relinquished all rights were considered temporary before the
mid-twentieth century).
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Over time, the children’s rights movement and the delegitimization
of children’s labor made adopting children for their economic utility un-
palatable and actively discouraged.205  Yet, in an about face, parents be-
came eager to pay for children to fulfill procreative desires when health or
circumstances made natural birth unavailable.206  Baby markets to acquire
precious, healthy babies developed although the law and ethics tried to
discourage such markets, or at least make them “gray”—avoiding payment
directly to birth parents.207  Thus, historically, adoption could be differen-
tiated from a free-market purchase of babies due to controlling regulation;
but, one cannot pretend that adoption has not consistently and funda-
mental involved financial remuneration and financial incentives.
4. Global Bust and Boom
In fact, the similarities between ICA and international surrogacy are
becoming more apparent, with the specter of commodification and ex-
ploitation beginning to mar both processes in similar ways.  While there
are still high demands from the “acquiring” population interested in ob-
taining surrogacy services or in adopting children from abroad, sending
countries are reigning in their supply of children, in both contexts, for
fear of the way each system treats their citizens.
The boom and bust quality of ICA has been observed for years.208  A
sending country opens its doors to allowing its unparented or orphaned
children to be adopted, only to close its doors a few years later leaving
parents in limbo, and other potential adoptive families looking for other
countries willing to engage.  From Ethiopia to Romania, Guatemala, Viet-
nam, Laos, China, Russia, and many more, countries follow a “boom and
bust” cycle in sending children for ICA: “When scandals emerge, govern-
ments lumber into action.  But then the demand just shifts to another
country, and the problems start all over again.”209
205. ZELIZER, supra note 201, at 176 (explaining that children were re-envi-
sioned as sacred treasures to be valued for the emotional, sentimental rewards of
raising them and not the economic benefits to the family).
206. JULIE BEREBITSKY, LIKE OUR VERY OWN: ADOPTION AND THE CHANGING
CULTURE OF MOTHERHOOD, 1851-1950 51–74 (2000) (describing adoption as a way
to cure infertility and the stigma childlessness caused); ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN
IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 141
(1997) (explaining how after WWII was an era of “compulsory parenthood” that
saw adoption as a service for the infertile).
207. ZELIZER, supra note 201, at 192 (“Sentimental adoption created an un-
precedented demand for children under three, especially for infants . . . . ‘there
[were] not enough babies to go around.’”).
208. See, e.g., KATHRYN JOYCE, THE CHILD CATCHERS: RESCUE, TRAFFICKING AND
THE NEW GOSPEL OF ADOPTION 132 (2013) (“[I]n recent years international adop-
tion has become an ever-quickening boom-bust spiral.”); Kathryn Joyce, The Evan-
gelical Orphan Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/
09/22/opinion/sunday/the-evangelical-orphan-boom.html.
209. Joyce, supra note 208; see also BECCA MCBRIDE, THE GLOBALIZATION OF
ADOPTION: INDIVIDUALS, STATES, AND AGENCIES ACROSS BORDERS 95–109 (2016)
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This same boom and bust system is now plaguing international surro-
gacy as local governments are increasingly troubled by the international
trade in their women’s reproductive services.210  India, Thailand, and cer-
tain regions of Mexico were just a few years ago the biggest markets for
international surrogacy, but all have since outlawed the practice interna-
tionally, although commercial domestic surrogacy is still allowed.211  Ne-
pal, another popular destination for surrogacy, has banned the process
completely in order to protect its citizens.  Such bans in popular destina-
tion countries are only leading to the rise of commercial surrogacy in
other locales, where, arguably, there are even more language barriers and
even more poverty—such as in Guatemala and Western Africa, the sites of
numerous adoption scandals.212  When India first banned surrogacy for
gay men, before it banned all international surrogacy, Indian agencies re-
sponded by relocating to Nepal, Thailand, and Cambodia, flying out fro-
zen embryos that were awaiting wombs and women who were already
pregnant to give birth.  Now, in the wake of further bans, the business is
shifting to South America, Africa, Greece, Laos, and Ukraine.  Indian wo-
men seeking to be surrogates are going to places like Kenya, far from their
families and friends, unable to speak the local language, and they are
therefore more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.213  The demand for
babies is unstoppable given the existence of poor countries with women
desperate to make money often to feed their own hungry children.  The
insatiable market for children will find supply somewhere, even as some
governments try to ban it.  And, unlike ICA, there is no Hague Convention
banning the market—the market is accepted even if distasteful.
5. The Baby Markets Dilemma—Designer Babies and Children in Need
Despite the fears of commodification and corruption in both meth-
ods of collaborative family-formation, baby markets still thrive in the con-
text of collaborative ART.  And we might want to salvage some form of
ICA.  It is still undisputed that there are millions of children worldwide
who need food, shelter, and care, despite the reality that, in many of the
countries in which they live, it is hard to avoid the fear of fraud and cor-
ruption.214  UNICEF reports that  about 2.7 million children live in institu-
tionalized care, although others put the numbers higher at 8-12
(describing boom and bust cycle across numerous countries); ROTABI &
BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 155–56 (summarizing boom and bust nature of ICA).
210. As Demand for Surrogacy Soars, supra note 67; ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra
note 9, at 125–26 (describing boom and bust in India, Thailand, and Nepal which
all currently ban foreign surrogacy).
211. See ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 125–26 (describing boom and
bust in India, Thailand, and Nepal which all currently ban foreign surrogacy).
212. See supra Part II(B).
213. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
214. Orphans, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/media/orphans [https://
perma.cc/FU9D-22CJ] (last visited Nov. 9, 2018).  UNICEF and global partners
define an orphan as a child under 18 years of age who has lost one or both parents
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million.215  There are also many more millions of children who are or-
phaned or “unparented” and living on the streets.216  Although some crit-
ics argue that the number of orphans has been exaggerated by pro-
adoption advocates,217 it is still evident that the number of legal orphans
who could benefit from adoption far exceeds the number of adoptions
that occur annually.218  While intermediaries may be portrayed as “mafi-
osos” because of the money that they make from child placement, when
the government is not able to manage child welfare and neglect, children
may otherwise be left to die and suffer.219  Studies indicate that children
raised in institutions and without families suffer serious effects from such
environments, especially young children, and struggle on all barometers
of successful development with high rates of criminality, low rates of rais-
ing their own families, or holding jobs.220  Advocates for ICA point to chil-
dren’s right to have stable homes.221
Advocates for ICA also point to impossibly high morbidity rates, de-
grees of hunger, lack of education amongst the poorest, orphaned, and
institutionalized children in sending countries, and the gut-wrenching fact
that poor children from these countries have very high mortality rates.222
Ultimately, the long-term outcomes for children adopted from abroad are
to any cause of death.  By this definition, there were nearly 140 million orphans
globally in 2015, with 15.1 million having lost both parents.
215. Id.; Corinna Csa´ky, Keeping Children out of Harmful Institutions: Why We
Should be Investing in Family-Based Care, SAVE THE CHILDREN 3 (Nov. 2009), https://
resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/1398/pdf/1398.pdf [Permalink un-
available] (noting at least 8 million and likely much higher number).
216. Susan O’Rourke Von Struensee, Violence, Exploitation and Children: High-
lights of the United Nations Children’s Convention and International Response to Children’s
Human Rights, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 589, 616 (1995); see also Marc D.
Seitles, Effect of the Convention on the Rights of the Child Upon Street Children in Latin
America: A Study of Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala, 16 IN PUB INT. 159, 159 (1997);
Janet Shapiro, Ethically Informed Practice with Families Formed via International Adop-
tion: Linking Care Ethics with Narrative Approaches to Social Welfare Practice, 6(4) ETH-
ICS & SOC. WELFARE 333, 336 (2012) (pointing to 8 million children living in
orphanage settings, and 100 million street children).
217. See, e.g., Fiona Bowie, Adoption and the Circulation of Children: A Compara-
tive Perspective, in CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACHES TO ADOPTION 3, 14 (Fiona Bowie
ed., 2004; Claudia Fonesca, The Circulation of Children in a Brazilian Working-Class
Neighborhood: A Local Practice in a Globalized World, in CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACHES
TO ADOPTION 165 (Fiona Bowie ed., 2004); Oreskovic & Maskew, supra note 96, at
74.
218. Carlson, supra note 24, at 770.
219. Landrieu & Reitz, supra note 108, at 350–51 (“[C]orruption is an every-
day occurrence in many countries in all facets of life, particularly in underdevel-
oped countries, which are home to many children involved in international
adoptions.  In some places, nothing happens until palms are greased.”).
220. See, e.g., id. at 346–48.
221. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 19–32; Elisabeth
Bartholet, International Adoption: The Human Rights Issues, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY
AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES (2010).
222. MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 21 (calculating the hundreds
of children saved by adoption based on morbidity rates).
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overwhelmingly positive as compared to children left behind in orphan-
ages and poverty.223  The problem is the vast difference between the po-
tential for fraud and corruption—and the history of such corruption—
before the adoption occurs and the positive outcomes afterwards.224  And,
as has been shown, attempts to fight corruption tend to bring these adop-
tion systems to a halt.  Thus, the question is whether anything can be done
to salvage a functional system of ICA while mitigating fears of commodifi-
cation, exploitation, and corruption.
In sum, although collaborative ART markets and commercial adop-
tion can be distinguished, the parallels between these two systems are strik-
ing.  They both involve exchanges of money, legally and historically, and
they both involve the problem of commodification and exploitation, espe-
cially when collaborators are distant geographically and culturally from
the acquiring parents.  The vast difference in the way commercial adop-
tion is treated as opposed to commercial surrogacy is suspect in light of
the ethical benefits of caring for children in need as opposed to creating
genetic “designer” babies.  Only adoption can provide homes to children
without shelter and food and the law’s harsh treatment of adoption as
compared to surrogacy is hard to justify.  A willingness to accept a market
that commodifies and exploits women while fiercely fending off payment
to needy birth parents who are struggling to provide for their families,
results in a system willing to commodify women unless they are deemed
legal parents.  But the complex reality for struggling birth parents, their
children, and surrogates is more complex than such neat definitions and
distinctions allow.
IV. A NEW FRAME FOR COLLABORATIVE BABY-MAKING
A. Money, Markets and the Stain of Acquisition
In the previous parts, I have attempted to demonstrate that, although
surrogacy is recognized and accepted as being highly marketized and
adoption is perceived as not appropriate for commodification, the reasons
to differentiate between the two systems pale in comparison to the ways
such systems run in parallel.  In war-torn, and poverty-stricken countries,
where poor and even devastated people seek a better life, agents, in-
termediaries, surrogates, and birth parents will go to desperate measures
to obtain basic necessities and feed starving, uncared for, or merely uned-
ucated and languishing children.  In such a context, the wealthy, white
westerner from abroad coming to a starving country to obtain a child to
build their family in exchange for money will threaten to exploit and com-
modify, creating concerns about fraud and impropriety, whether in the
223. Id. at 104–08; ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 3 (citing numerous
studies of positive outcomes for children of ICA).
224. ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing contrast between out-
comes of adoption and the troubled stories of how ICA comes to be).
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context of surrogacy or adoption.225  Even if adoptive parents seek to help
children in need,226 the specter of the wealthy buying children from desti-
tute foreigners with whom they cannot even communicate threatens the
dignity and security of the foreign nation and its people.  In adopting
abroad, Madonna and Angelina Jolie both expressed the desire to adopt
for the sake of helping children in need, but in both cases, they became
embroiled in inevitable allegations of corruption and fraud.227  So, too,
international surrogacy seems soiled by the very nature of the system, re-
gardless of good intentions and agreements that provide benefits to all
participants.
Tobias Huniette describes why commodified acquisition is so troub-
ling by identifying striking similarities between ICA and the Atlantic slave
trade—both are driven by insatiable consumer demand, private market
interests, and cynical profit-making.228  “[B]oth utilize a highly advanced
system of pricing where the young, the healthy, and the light skinned are
the most valued . . . .  Both the enslaved and the adopted are separated
from their parents, siblings, relatives, and other significant others at an
early age; stripped of their original cultures and languages; reborn at
harbors or airports.”229  International surrogacy, at its worst, shares a simi-
lar threat to commodifying surrogate women.  Treated as vessels for the
children they bear, their health, autonomy, and dignity are traded for
money in surrogate contracts that can force them to abort, to undergo
invasive procedures, and to allow doctors to prioritize the babies’ health
over their own.230
The problem of abuse, commodification, and exploitation, “com-
modification anxiety,” is commonly associated with the exchange of
money for persons, bodies, organs, parenthood, or other intimate con-
cerns considered to be inappropriate for the market.231  Indeed, we see
225. Bergquist, supra note 146, at 349; see also supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
226. ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 2 (adoption is a religious calling
for some—to save the orphan); DENIESE MAGNESS DILLON, AN INCONVENIENT CALL-
ING: A FORTY YEAR JOURNEY IN INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS AND HUMANITARIAN AID
7–11 (2017) (describing adoption as a calling).
227. MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 7 (“Madonna is showing ex-
actly what shouldn’t be done: airlifting one or two pretty children into the compar-
ative wealth of the West, leaving behind bereft families who want— but can’t
afford—to bring that child home.”) (citing E.J. Graff, The Seamier Side of Interna-
tional Adoption, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (May 10, 2009, 8:00 PM), https://
roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/celebrity-adoptions-and-the-real-
world/ [https://perma.cc/6SVG-3P2S]); id. at 113–14 (discussing the way Ma-
donna bypassed residency laws in Malawi to enable Madonna to adopt a child);
ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing how both the Jolie and Ma-
donna adoptions caused an uproar).
228. MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 13.
229. Hubinette, supra note 9, at 143.
230. See supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text.
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how the market has led to fears of exploitation, commodification, and
fraud in both adoption and surrogacy.  However, we also know that the
market is what facilitates collaborative baby-making and that, without it,
such systems would not function.232  The question is whether there is any
way to regulate an ethical and noncorrupt system of collaborative family-
making while still permitting the exchange of money that fuels the
process.
The resolution of this dilemma is to understand that it is not the ex-
change of money alone, even for intimate services or objects, that is cor-
rupting.  Arguing that money does not essentially corrupt intimate
exchanges, Viviana Zelizer provides myriad sociological and empirical ex-
amples of how money and intimacy are essentially intertwined, highlight-
ing the financial aspects in intimate relationships that are barely hidden
beneath the surface.233  According to Zelizer, we are all connected to peo-
ple in many ways, and the market and the intimate are in constant interac-
tion, being negotiated and parsed.234  Moreover, although the way
transactions in intimate goods and services mix money and emotions may
make them difficult to negotiate, “people manage to integrate monetary
transfers into larger webs of mutual obligations without destroying the so-
cial ties involved.”235  Thus, she argues that attempts to separate money
from intimate sales are about setting boundaries between intimacy and
commerciality, not about complete separation.236  It is not money itself
that corrupts, but the way money can dehumanize human interactions.
Zelizer argues that the goal of regulation should be to create what she
terms “fair mixtures” between markets and intimate, human relations and
body parts—“We should stop agonizing over whether or not money cor-
rupts, but instead analyze what combinations of economic activity and inti-
mate relations produce happier, more just, and more productive lives.”237
The question is what is a “fair mixture”—what combinations of economic
activity and baby-making minimize harm, advance justice, and reflect our
notions of modern parenthood and children’s rights.  Put differently, how
232. See supra notes 126–136 and accompanying text.
233.  ZELIZER, supra note 27, at 28–32.  Intimate sales include “taboo trades”:
(1) the sale of human bodies (baby-selling, organs); (2) the sale of ongoing bodily
functions (slavery, surrogacy, prostitution); and (3) the sale of love (care services,
intimate relationships). See Goodwin, supra note 61, at 805.
234. See, e.g., Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money-Or Both?, 14 J.
ECON. PERSP. 123, 132 (2000) (“One could, of course, let self-interest overtake al-
truistic concerns and do the work in a cold-hearted way, but this not implied a
priori.  One could, in fact, be exceptionally nonmaterialistic and generous.”).
235. ZELIZER, supra note 27, at 28.
236. Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify:
That is Not the Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 362 (Martha M. Ertman
& Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (“[T]o commodify or not to commodify that is not
the question.”).
237. Id.
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do we allow the exchange of money for children, without commoditizing
and dehumanizing the children and other vulnerable parties?238
The exchange of money for intimate concerns does not necessarily
corrupt; rather, it is treating people as commodities that can be purchased
and consumed that is corrupting.  It is not the transfer of wealth from
adoptive to birth families that commodifies the system inappropriately, it
is treating children and birth families as commodities and not as interest
and rights bearers who are part of the collaborative process of family-mak-
ing.  There is nothing corrupt or exploitative about surrogate mothers re-
ceiving money—they work hard for their fee, investing their time and
energy, risking their health, and compromising their freedom.239  What is
corrupting is the way international surrogates, in particular, are treated
like incubators, their status as medical patients, their rights to informed
consent in medical-decision making ignored, and their human dignity in-
fringed when they are treated as disposable and irrelevant at the child’s
birth.
The frame of acquisition currently shaping the legal treatment of col-
laborative family-making is not sustainable in the context of surrogacy or
adoption.  Collaborative family-making currently exists within an acquisi-
tion framework in that it allows intended parents to procure a child
through payment and they are delivered such a child free of all connec-
tions to other collaborators, even birth parents.  Surrogates sell their
rights to free and noncoercive medical treatment, the right to interact
with a child they carried for nine months, and their right to make many
life choices during pregnancy.  Birth parents surrender all connections to
their child.  Surrogates and birth parents are essentially erased by the na-
ture of the financial transaction.  Such transactions are not sufficiently
concerned with the rights, status, and interests of children, surrogates, and
birth parents, which are the weaker parties in the transaction who are es-
sentially erased by the transaction in order to fulfill the intended parents’
demand.  In this way family-making collaborators are acquired and treated
as commodities.
B. Interconnection and Ongoing Contact: From Empirical Studies to Legal
Regulation
Instead of designing collaborative family-making as acquisition, we
need to view collaborative family-making as a system of human collabora-
238. Cadoret, supra note 28, at 280.
239. See, e.g., ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 136 (describing surrogates
perspectives on their efforts as powerful work); Folbre & Nelson, supra note 234, at
132 (discussing the way surrogacy is viewed as commercial work and altruistic be-
havior); Elly Teman, The Social Construction of Surrogacy Research: An Anthropological
critique of the Psychological Scholarship on Surrogate Motherhood, SOC. SCI. & MED. 67,
1104–12 (2008) (discussing the importance of the work aspect of surrogacy and
the money received for commercial surrogates); see also PANDE, supra note 189, at
60–70.
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tion and interconnection.  Humans cannot be bought or sold, they cannot
be acquired or consumed, and neither can their baby-making capabilities.
People, however, can be collaborated with in exchange for remuneration.
Collaboration entails a mutual relationship where both parties have a role,
a voice, rights, autonomy, status, and recognition.  The more the parties
are on equal footing—the less one party is silenced and merely used as a
vessel for producing a child—the more ethical and interconnected the
collaborative family-law making.  Interconnection ethically recognizes col-
laborators as part of process and not people who can be erased by finan-
cial transaction.  Therefore, interconnection involves openness and
ongoing contact.
Social science studies attest to the nature of collaboration and inter-
connection in practice.  As described above, in domestic surrogate sys-
tems, where surrogates and intended families share a cultural
understanding, language, and geographic proximity, empirical studies all
attest to the natural development of close relationships among collabora-
tors in addition to a commercial exchange.240  These relationships flow
naturally from the intimacy of the surrogate process and the nature of the
shared venture.241  The intended parents are grateful and feel empathetic
and connected to the woman who is helping them achieve their procrea-
tive desires.242  The intended parents want the surrogate to feel happy and
secure and thereby, also enable her to act in accordance with their wishes
regarding the pregnancy.  The surrogate seeks the emotional attachments
to help her contend with the physical and emotional turmoil of enduring
a pregnancy for the sake of others.243  And, it is only connection and rela-
tionships that can curb the fear of intended parents not caring for the
surrogate’s well-being, physical health, and rights to informed consent in
medical decision-making during the surrogate process.244  Such relation-
ships appear to provide security and a sense of self-worth that is important
to surrogates.245  Surrogates indicate that, although they are professionals
working for money, they are also providing a tremendous gift to intended
parents and expect appreciation and the relationship that develops in-
volves real emotional bonds.246  In other words, surrogates want to be
240. See supra notes 177–182 and accompanying text.
241. Parks, supra note 72, at 335 (“[H]uman beings are not best understood
as individual rights bearers or property owners, but as vulnerable beings-in-rela-
tionship who rely on one another for care, concern, nurture, and identity.”).
242. TEMAN, supra note 177, at 142–47, 205–29; Baslington, supra note 177, at
66–67; Homan & Hagan, supra note 177, at 67–69, 81–82; Ragone, supra note 177,
at 359-62.
243. TEMAN, supra note 177, at 142–47, 205–29; Baslington, supra note 177, at
66–67; Homan & Hagan, supra note 177, at 67–69, 81–82; Ragone, supra note 177,
at 359–62.
244. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 174, at 145–46.
245. TEMAN, supra note 177, at 205–33; Pande, supra note 1, at 619.
246. See LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: HOW ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
IS CHANGING MEN, WOMEN, AND THE WORLD 136 (2007); TEMAN, supra note 177, at
205–33.
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treated as more than wombs for hire, they want to be treated as humans
who are connecting and interacting with the intended family.  Only such
relations appear to safeguard the woman’s self-worth allowing her to feel
as an equal partner—more than a mere womb for rent.
Statistics and empirical accounts of domestic adoption parallel ac-
counts of domestic surrogate motherhood with regards to the develop-
ment of interconnected relationships.  In its more traditional form,
adoption transferred all parental rights from birth parents to adoptive par-
ents, erasing the legal and empirical reality of genetic parents and sealing
their identities.247  The era of secrecy and complete transfer of parental
rights, creating privacy and exclusivity in adopted parents and complete
alienation from birth families, has been understood to have developed in
a time of prejudice and racism.248  Adoption was part of a moral condem-
nation of birth families’ inability to raise their own children, or recalci-
trant behavior that led to unwed childbirth.249  More recently, adoption is
looked at as a solution for single Black motherhood.250
But a new reality has taken shape, particularly in the U.S., but in other
domestic adoption systems as well.251  Social changes and movements, in-
cluding adoptive children’s desire to open sealed documents revealing
their genetic identities and to connect to birth families, the reduction of
shame in parenthood out of wedlock, and an increase in adoption of older
children where erasing birth parents is less tenable, have resulted in vastly
greater openness in adoption.252  Currently, open adoption is the norm in
247. SHANLEY, supra note 168, at 15–20.
248. Annette R. Appell, Controlling for Kin: Ghosts in the Postmodern Family, 25
WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 73, 89–90 (2010) (“This regime is not surprising in light
of the historic context of adoption, the legal regulation of which evolved during a
time when poor, racially marginalized children were placed for adoption as a
method of socializing them into White middle-class, Protestant norms.”).  Italian,
German, and Irish children saved during the child saving and progressive eras in
the late 19th and early 20th century were considered not white. Id. (citing LINDA
GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 76-77, 98-106 (1999)).
249. Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 421, 457–62 (2004) (noting simultaneous and racialized discourse surround-
ing the promotion of color-blind adoption, cutbacks on support for single mothers
and children, and reduced protections of maternal-child bonds in child welfare
policy).
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., Rhoda Scherman, Openness and Intercountry Adoption in New Zea-
land, in INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 288–89
(Judith L. Gibbons & Karen Smith Rotabi eds., 2012); Ouellette, supra note 38, at
69–75 (discussing open adoption in Quebec).
252. See E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE
HISTORY OF ADOPTION 215 (1998) (“In the new world of adoption, with its dearth
of white infants and with open adoption gaining popularity, adoptive parents were
powerless to disagree with birth parents’ demands for openness.”); Appell, supra
note 248, at 91 (“Armed with this moral authority, birth mothers began to seek
adoptive parents who would be willing to engage in open adoption in which birth
and adoptive parents meet each other and might even have ongoing contact”);
Appell, supra note 249, at 457; see also Cynthia R. Mabry, The Psychological and Emo-
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domestic U.S. adoption systems.253  Openness is driven largely by the de-
mands of birth parents in private adoption and older children in public
adoptions.254  There is a large variety of openness, ranging from meetings
before birth and exchanges of information to ongoing interconnection
through the life of the child.255  There is fluidity in openness levels, with
studies showing that contact is subsequently established in some arrange-
ments that did not start off as open, while relationships are sometimes
curtailed or ended even though the initial plan had been for ongoing con-
tact.256  The stories of openness are varied and complex and no single
model applies.257  The variety of openness reflects the range of situations
that collaborative families make for themselves.258
Secrecy and the lack of transparency are no longer considered posi-
tive in most cases for any of the parties involved, especially birth parents
tional Ties that Bind Biological and Adoptive Families: Whether Court-Ordered Postadoption
Contact Is in an Adopted Child’s Best Interest, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 285, 323–24 (2014)
(arguing in favor of post-adoption contact); Evan P. Donaldson Adoption Institute,
Openness in Adoption: From Secrecy and Stigma to Knowledge and Connections 5-6 (March
2012), https://www.adoptioninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/
2012_03_OpennessInAdoption.pdf [https://perma.cc/D34Y-BNC9] (“As the
stigma gradually evaporated over the ensuing decades, the number of agencies
offering open adoptions grew rapidly and, by 1999, close to 80 percent offered that
option”).
253. See supra note 252 (noting that open adoptions have become an increas-
ingly popular option).
254. Id.; see also Annette Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications
for Collaborative Adoption Law & Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1008–09, 1028–29
(1995); Lucy McGaugh & Annette-Peltter Falahahwai, Secrets and Lies: A Model Stat-
ute for Collaborative Adoption, 60 LA. L. REV. 13, 66–67 (1999) (“Indeed, in an adop-
tion market of scarcity, their superior bargaining power is believed to be the
impetus behind the open adoption trend.”).
255. See Appell, supra note 248, at 92–93 (discussing various ways states handle
open-adoption contracts); Chris Jones & Simon Hackett, Communicative Openness
Within Adoptive Families: Adoptive Parents’ Narrative Accounts of the Challenges of Adop-
tion Talk and the Approaches Used to Manage These Challenges, ADOPTION Q. 157,
158–59 (2007) (describing a variety of medium whereby post-adoption contact be-
tween birth families and adoptive families is maintained, including handwritten,
electronic, and telephonic); Carol Sanger, Bargaining for Motherhood: Post Adoption
Visitation Agreements, 41 HOF. L. REV. 309, 321–22 (2013) (discussing the range of
participants in open adoptions as well as the type of arrangements).
256. HAROLD D. GROTEVANT & RUTH G. MCROY, OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: EX-
PLORING FAMILY CONNECTIONS (1998); Thomas M. Crea & Richard P. Barth, Pat-
terns and Predictors of Adoption Openness and Contact: Fourteen Years Postadoption, Paper
presented at 14th Annual Conference of the Soc’y for Soc. Work & Research (Jan. 16, 2010),
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Thomas_Crea/publication/
268081330_Pat-
terns_and_Predictors_of_Open_Adoptions_Fourteen_Years_Postadoption/links/
546cc9010cf2a7492c55a9d9/Patterns-and-Predictors-of-Open-Adoptions-Fourteen-
Years-Postadoption.pdf [Permalink unavailable].
257. See, e.g., GUYLAINE HUBBARD-BROSMER & ANN WRIXON, TRUE STORIES OF
OPEN ADOPTION (2013) (providing a myriad of stories reflecting the variety and
complexity of interaction and involvement between birth parent and adoptive par-
ents and their kin).
258. Id.
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and children, but for adoptive parents as well.259  Fears that children
would be confused by multiple attachments seem overstated, as children
in open adoption arrangements attest to feeling secure in their attach-
ments to adoptive parents,260 and more self-confident and grounded due
to knowing their birth parents, or at least knowing their identities.261
Children in open adoption with ongoing contact are more satisfied with
the level of openness in their own adoptions than are those without such
contact, identifying the following benefits: coming to terms with the rea-
sons for their adoption, physical touchstones to identify where personal
traits came from, information that aids in identity formation, positive feel-
ings towards their birthmother, and others.262  Indeed, it is the lack of
such contact with birth parents and knowledge about places of origin that
seems to inject insecurity into adoptees.263  On the whole, studies show
that openness in adoption enhances adoptees’ lives, especially in trans-
racial adoptions and provides overall security and stability.264  Birth
mothers fair better in grief resolution and in being whole with their deci-
259. GROTEVANT & MCROY, supra note 256, at 91–92; Harold D. Grotevant et
al., Openness in Adoption: Outcomes for Adolescents Within Their Adoptive Kinship Net-
works, in ADVANCES IN APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES
IN ADOPTION: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 167–86 (2005).
260. David Brodzinsky, Family Structural Openness and Communication Openness
as Predicators in the Adjustment of Adoption Children, 6 ADOPTION Q. 1, 10 (2006);
Amanda Hawkins et al., Communicative Openness About Adoption and Interest in Con-
tact in a Sample of Domestic and Intercountry Adolescent Adoptees, 10 ADOPTION Q. 131,
132 (2007); Rachel Levy-Shiff, Psychological Adjustment of Adoptees in Adulthood, 25
INT’L J. BEHAV. DEV. 97 (2001).
261.  GROTEVANT & MCROY, supra note 256, at 91–92; Annette Baran, Reuben
Pannor & Arthur Sorosky, Open Adoption, in SOC. WORK 97, 97 (Mar. 1976) (“There
is no sound reason to continue in the belief that biological parents be banished, or
that a child’s emotional connections with biological parents preclude the creation
of healthy and stable placements.”); Margaret Sykes, Adoption with Contact: A Study
of Adoptive Parents and the Impact of Continuing Contact with Families of Origin, ADOP-
TION & FOSTERING 20, 25 (2005);
262. See Jerica M. Berge et al., Adolescents’ Feelings About Openness in Adoption:
Implications for Adoption Agencies, 85(6) CHILD WELFARE 1011, 1011–39 (2006)
(describing children’s satisfaction with openness in adoption); Harold D. Grote-
vant et al., Many Faces of Openness in Adoption: Perspectives of Adopted Adolescents and
Their Parents, 10 ADOPTION Q. 79, 79–101 (2007); Gretchen Miller Wrobel et al.,
Factors Related to Patterns of Information Exchange Between Adoptive Parents and Children
in Mediated Adoptions, 19(4) J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 641, 641–57
(1998).
263. GROTEVANT & MCROY, supra note 256, at 91–92; Appell, supra note 248,
at 100–05. But see Michael P. Sobol et al., Paths to the Facilitation of Open Adoption, 49
FAM. REL. 419, 419 (2000) (“[O]pen adoption interferes with proper grieving for
the birth mother, has negative effects on the child’s development, leads to adop-
tive parent insecurity and uncertainty, and is more likely to result in identity confu-
sion for the adoptee.”).
264. Marianne Berry, Adoptive Parents’ Perceptions of, and Comfort with, Open
Adoption, 72 CHILD WELFARE 231, 231–46 (1993) (noting benefits to adoptees in
transracial adoptions); Lynn Vok Korff et al., Openness Arrangements and Psychologi-
cal Adjustment in Adolescent Adoptees, 20 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 531, 534 (2006).
44
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss2/3
2019] COLLABORATIVE FAMILY-MAKING 267
sion to relinquish exclusive parenthood rights.265  Openness has also been
shown to benefit adoptive parents who feel comfortable and secure in
their attachments with adoptive children and with the contact with birth
mothers.266  Indeed, openness reduces fear that children would be taken
away as opposed to exacerbate it; transparency assists security as opposed
to threatening it.
Thus, in surrogacy, interconnection is a reflection of the relationship
that happens during the pregnancy and naturally continues post-birth.  In
adoption, on the other hand, interconnection happens based on the de-
mands of birth parents due to their greater bargaining power and their
desire to have contact with their genetic offspring.  Interconnection in
adoption also serves the interests of children and even adoptive parents
who find security and identity in contact with birth parents.  Interconnec-
tion in surrogacy reflects the reality of interconnection de facto while, in
adoption, interconnection is created by mutual agreement, ex ante.
Neither surrogacy nor adoption legally require such interconnection;
rather, studies indicate they develop on their own through private under-
standings and agreements.  Moreover, even when the parties agree to such
openness in advance, such contact is not always enforceable.267  It is time
for a change—the law should help craft and promote a system of ongoing
contact and interconnection in collaborative family-making ex-ante and
not only as a matter of practice, but as a matter of protected rights and
interests for the sake of vulnerable parties—birth parents, children, and
surrogates.  I have suggested that interconnection should frame surrogate
motherhood, and have argued that surrogates should have a right to re-
265. Linda Cushman, Debra Kalmuss & Pearila Namerow, Openness in Adop-
tion: Experiences and Social Psychological Outcomes Among Birth Mothers, 25 MARRIAGE &
FAM. REV. 7, 7–18 (1997) (explaining birthmothers who have ongoing contact with
their children report less grief, regret and worry, as well as more peace of mind,
than do those who do not have contact).
266. GROTEVANT & MCROY, supra note 256, at 90–92 (finding greater open-
ness is linked with reduced fear and greater empathy toward birthparents, more
open communication with their children about adoption, and other benefits in
their relationships with their adopted children) (citing Berry et al., 1998; Grote-
vant, Perry & McRoy, 1994; Siegel, 2008).
267. See, e.g., In re Visitation of K.M., No. 3-15-0724, 2017 WL 657641, at *4
(Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 17, 2017) (due to public policy reasons, Illinois does not recog-
nize post-adoption visitation agreements); Birth Mother v. Adoptive Parents, 59
P.3d 1233, 1235 (Nev. 2002) (refusing to uphold visitation agreements not entered
into under specific statute or entered into in the absence of a statute providing for
enforcement); Sanger, supra note 255, at 319–20 (“By 2011, twenty-six states and
the District of Columbia had enacted laws providing for some form of enforceable
agreement between birth parents and adoptive parent.”).  Some states enforce
contact agreements, but only if they are found to be in the best interests of chil-
dren. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31–19–16–1 to -2 (West 2018) (allowing a court
to order post-adoption visitation as long as it is determined to be in the child’s best
interests); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.58 (West 2007); In re Adoption of S.K.L.H., 204
P.3d 320, 333 (Alaska 2009) (allowing open adoption if the post-adoption agree-
ment is part of divorce decree); Groves v. Clark, 982 P.2d 446 (Mont. 1999); Birth
Mother, 59 P.3d at 1236.
45
Laufer-Ukeles: Collaborative Family-Making: From Acquisition to Interconnection
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
268 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64: p. 223
tain openness and interconnection with birth families.268  Such intercon-
nection can also be framed as a matter of legal expectation within the
adoption context.  In both contexts, empirical accounts indicate the need
for enforcement is not necessary in most circumstances.  However, in its
expressive capacity, the law can set certain expectations, and create under-
standings that promote and facilitate openness and ongoing contact in
collaborative family-making.269  Ultimately, in a system that expects ongo-
ing contact, the intended or adoptive parents need to be concerned with
the collaborators’ well-being and stability, their autonomy and dignity, and
the potential for fraud and abuse, because the collaborators will not disap-
pear.  This ongoing contact should be supported because it is an essential
factor in staving off fears of commodification and exploitation.  Indeed,
studies indicate that the lack of contact can harm surrogates who feel com-
modified,270 and does not appear to be beneficial for adoptive children,
creating perceptions of instability, the lack of identity, and the lack of
transparency.  Such protections should not be left to private ordering, as
weaker parties will not be able to sufficiently protect their interests, partic-
ularly in international collaborative family-making where power dynamics
are more unbalanced due to gaps in education, social and political power,
as well as economic disparities.271  It is therefore necessary for the law to
step in to help birth parents and surrogates, who are usually more vulnera-
ble and have less bargaining power, and are at danger of being commodi-
tized and exploited, to establish such contact to protect family-making
collaborators and the children they help create.
This does not mean that if a collaborator in family-making is not in-
terested in ongoing interconnection she can or should be forced to do
so—she will, however, retain the ability to do so if she chooses.  Moreover,
such contact need not be regular and overly invasive, but occasional and
may involve correspondence as opposed to in-person meetings.272  Moreo-
ver, mere consent through private ordering to an arrangement (or lack
thereof) between collaborators as a reflection of autonomy is not
268. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1267–78.  Note, however, that I argue that
due to the geographic distance that prevents interconnection and relationship-
forming during international surrogacy, international surrogacy should be avoided
in favor of domestic surrogacy where interconnection can be promoted. Id. at
1275–78.
269. Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 835, 836–37 (1985) (non-recognition is still a form of regulation leaving
power to private ordering as opposed to protection from the state).
270. See supra notes 177–183 and accompanying text.
271. See Smerdon, supra note 73, at 54; Ryznar, supra note 65, at 167;
Donchin, supra note 193; Pande, supra note 189, at 60.
272. See Appell, supra note 248, at 92–93; Sanger, supra note 255, at 321–22;
Jones & Hackett, supra note 255, at 158–59 (discussing the varied ways domestic
adoption functions).
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enough.273  From the perspective of relational autonomy, autonomy is not
something that can be achieved by consent, but the law can promote au-
tonomy, fairness, and ethical markets through facilitative regulation.274
A frequent criticism of the openness and interconnection I describe is
that it violates the privacy of the intended parents in surrogacy or the
adoptive parents in adoption.275  Indeed, some adoptive parents seek ICA
or international surrogacy for the way collaborators are less present in the
arrangement.276  While the right to privacy keeps the state from prevent-
ing persons from having a child, the state does not need to similarly re-
frain from protective legislation in the context of collaborative family-
making based on privacy because collaborative family-making is funda-
mentally not a private undertaking and can have dramatic effects on third-
party collaborators.277  While intended parents retain primary legal
parenthood status, the existence of other collaborators need not detract
from their parenthood and can help frame the child’s identity.  In the
case where collaborators harass or impinge, courts will need to get in-
volved in any event to separate the parties regardless of legal provisions.  If
ongoing contact harms the child, it can of course remain electronic or be
suspended—but such cases are likely to be rare and identifiable given the
plethora of empirical accounts of positive ongoing relations.  Accordingly,
the nature of collaborative family-making involving third parties makes
such concerns overwrought.
Interconnectedness requires a new way of thinking about relation-
ships and kinship.278  Recognizing the reality of a multiplicity of family ties
273. See, e.g., Jennifer Damelio & Kelly Sorensen, Enhancing Autonomy in Paid
Surrogacy, 22 BIOETHICS 269, 275 (2008); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy:
Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8–9 (1989).
274. See, e.g., GRACE CLEMENT, CARE, AUTONOMY, & JUSTICE: FEMINISM AND THE
ETHIC OF CARE 21–22 (1996); Theresa Glennon, Regulation of Reproductive Decision-
making, in REGULATING AUTONOMY: SEX, REPRODUCTION AND FAMILY 149, 151–52
(Shelley Day Sclater et al. eds., 2009); Susan Sherwin, A Relational Approach to Au-
tonomy in Health Care, in THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S HEALTH: EXPLORING AGENCY
AND AUTONOMY 19, 26–28 (1998); Nedelsky, supra note 273, at 14.
275. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P. 2d 776, 786–87 (privacy concerns un-
dermine possibility of two mothers); Andrews, supra note 169, at 167; John A. Rob-
ertson, Procreative Liberty and the State’s Burden of Proof in Regulating Noncoital
Reproduction, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 24–27 (Larry Gos-
tin ed., 1990); Martin Hevia, Surrogacy, Privacy and the American Convention on
Human Rights, J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 15 (2018) (arguing that a right of ongoing
contact would be too much of an intrusion on intended parents privacy rights).
276. See Pande, supra note, at 618–20; Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1269–71;
Parks, supra note 38, at 334.
277. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 51, at 1478 (arguing that states can regulate ART
to protect third-party interests without violating privacy).
278. I use the term “kinship” in this Article for the way it has been understood
to create familial ties beyond blood relations based on shared relations or interests
and close ties surrounding common interests and goals between friends with emo-
tional connections. See DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, A CRITIQUE OF THE STUDY OF KINSHIP
97–112 (1984) (describing kinship as involving both biological and social dimen-
sions); CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMU-
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allows for a remodeling of collaborative family-making into a new form of
“kinship,” in which interconnected people share legal responsibilities and
financial benefits.  In both surrogacy and adoption, there is only one set of
legal parents, but other parties need not therefore be legal strangers.279
This frame of connectedness demands viewing relatedness as being mul-
tifaceted and rejecting the perspective of parenthood as binary and exclu-
sive of all other legal attachments to children.280
Interconnection blunts the impact of the stain of the acquisitional
frame and minimizes the commodification anxiety involved even when
money is transferred between intended parents and family-making col-
laborates.  For instance, discussing the benefits of ICA for children in
terms of the benefits of financial comfort—having an education, sufficient
food, basic health care, and a better quality of life—is often seen as inap-
propriate in the frame of acquisition.281  In their June 2012 policy brief,
NITY (1974) (explaining the difference between kin and blood relationships
among poor urban African-Americans).  As one anthropologist notes, “Kinship,
whether we choose to label it as biological, social or fictive, is a way of identifying
others as in some way special from the rest, people to whom the individual or
collectivity feel responsible in certain ways.”  Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Blood and
Water in a Post-Coital World, 49 FAM. L. Q. 117, 118 (2015) (citing Diana Gittins, The
Family in Question: What is Family? Is it Universal?, in SHIFTING THE CENTER: UNDER-
STANDING CONTEMPORARY FAMILIES (2010)).  One can use the language of kinship
to denote “the depth of connection between individuals who have made a commit-
ment to treat each other as family even without genetic connection.” Id. at 121.
Annette Appell uses the term “kinship” to describe the connections that develop
between birth families and adoptive families in open adoption. See Annette Ruth
Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law
and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1061 (1995) (noting that open adoption has the
potential for “creating a new kinship network that forever links the birth family
and the adoptive family through the child who is shared by both.”).
279. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 11, 19–20 (2008) (examining the advantage of extending parental status rec-
ognition to those currently called third parties or legal strangers); Melissa Murray,
The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers,
94 VA. L. REV. 385, 455 (2008) (discussing a conscious attempt by scholars to ad-
dress the changing composition of the American family in light of the current
legal construction of caregiving, which treats nonparents as strangers).
280. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children’s Rights: The Destruction and
Promise of Family, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 497, 501–03 (1993) (“The needs of children
have inexorably forced us to work with their real, functional families, and not the
formal family described by traditional law.”); Frank F. Furstenberg, Fifty Years of
Family Change: From Consensus to Complexity, 654 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 12, 22 (2014) (“As far as I know, there is no evidence that children growing up
in complex households in family systems across the globe experience more
problems in later life; indeed, there are reasons to expect just the opposite if multi-
ple caregivers (parents, grandparents, uncles, and aunts) provide attention and
care to children in the household. The greater number of parent figures, one
might hypothesize, the greater the investment in children so long as the attention
and care is stable and coordinated.”); Robert A. Simon, Polyparenting: The Psycholog-
ical Impact of Having Multiple “Parents” in a Child’s Life, 36 FAM. ADVOC. 35 (2013)
(discussing the way multiple parental figures have always raised children and the
benefits entailed).
281. MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 29–30.
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Intercountry Adoption, the NGO Save the Children expressed a widely-
held belief on the subject of poverty and adoption: “Poverty and a lack of
resources should never be a reason for the separation of a child from his
or her family.”282  We do not want financial resources to allow people to
acquire children because others are poor—it is too close to baby-selling.
However, if the child is not acquired, only saved and raised with economic
and food security while retaining contact with birth parents and birth cul-
ture, the benefits can be more easily appreciated without feeling that a
child has been sold due to poverty.  Similarly, a surrogate that receives
compensation for undergoing a traumatic pregnancy and invasive medical
procedures will appear more a participant and less a body acquired if she
is treated as ongoing kin within the family unit.
Interconnection can also reduce the fraud that is expected to result
from commodification of intimate subjects.  To understand abuse of ICA
in Guatemala, one must recognize the political instability, genocide and
rampant human rights abuses that were occurring in the background of
adoption—if the entire country is racked by violence against women,283
genocide of indigenous persons,284 and children left orphaned by war and
poverty,285—the potential for abuse in a system in which money flows to
agencies from wealthy western countries is troubling but not surprising.
In the background of rampant fraud and abuse, surrogates are also likely
to be exploited and used for the money they will bring.  In desperate
times, children are to go hungry and uncared for or even be abandoned
and starve—it is not really adoption itself or money that causes these
problems.  However, any chance for a financial payoff which incentivizes
agents and intermediaries to place children exacerbates the problem and
becomes part of an abusive system, making corruption seem inevitable.
Interconnection and transparency aim at the heart of the abuse in a sys-
tematic manner by encountering and recognizing the status of collabora-
tors who are feared to have been abused.
V. OPEN KINSHIP ADOPTION AS A NEW PARADIGM
A new system of intercountry adoption must be framed from an en-
tirely different perspective—one of interconnection and not acquisition.
This interconnection must treat foreigners as persons with rights and in-
terests, as well as ongoing presence, avoiding exploitation and commodifi-
cation of family-making collaborators to the extent possible.  Moreover,
282. Id. at 31–32 (citing international rights documents that object to ICA
based on poverty).
283. See, e.g., ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 64–72 (describing violence
against women and human rights abuses generally in Guatemala at the time of
adoption fraud).
284. See, e.g., id. at 71–73 (describing conditions of civil war and genocide in
Guatemala at the time of adoption scandals).
285. See, e.g., id. at 1–21 (describing the range of domestic crises that caused
instability and corruption in sending states beyond just adoption scandals).
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foreign collaborators’ need for money should be accounted for in this
type of system.  Collaborative family-making can be fueled by money and
yet treat people with dignity and support autonomy through regulations
that limit markets.  In this section, I set out three characteristics of a new
system of intercountry adoption through the frame of collaboration and
interconnection: 1) openness and continued contact; 2) regulated and
controlled wealth transfers to birth families and birth communities; and 3)
government agencies that coordinate and facilitate the interconnected vi-
sion of intercountry adoption and address abuse and fraud through main-
taining ongoing contact and openness.
A. Open Adoption in ICA and the Complex Kinship Family
Modern ICA is outdated, lags behind domestic adoption, and is too
marred by the stain of acquisition and corruption.  The secrecy and closed
nature of ICA reflects a system that developed in a climate of prejudice
and bias against those who were unable or unwilling given traditionalist
social dynamics to raise their own children.286  While social movements
and bargaining power have changed the nature of adoption domestically
in the U.S., in the more difficult dynamics of intercountry adoption, open-
ness has not taken hold.287
Indeed, more traditionalist foreign countries may still have prejudices
or other cultural reasons for keeping adoption secretive.288  On the other
hand, it also seems that foreign placements in orphanages are sometimes
intended by parents to be temporary in order to feed their children and
birth parents are not aware that they may be placed abroad permanently
without potential contact.289  Desperate families may do desperate things
to keep their children nourished and safe.  Even if children need to be
raised abroad for the sake of their own survival and ability to flourish,
contact should not be severed.  In order to save ICA and stave off the
specter of fraud and corruption surrounding intercountry adoption, sup-
porters should seek openness in the process, not only in terms of birth
parents’ identities, but also in advocating for sustaining contact between
birth parents and adoptive parents throughout the child’s youth.
The Hague Convention is premised on the traditional closed model
of adoption.290  The option for open adoption is not readily available be-
286. See supra notes 251–253 and accompanying text.
287. See infra note 321–322 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 159–60 (addressing
concerns that open adoption places western values on foreign countries).
289. See, e.g., id. at 118–21 (discussing cases of fraud where parents did not
knowingly relinquish parental rights to foreigners).  In this way, adoption may be
viewed in foreign countries as temporary and unbinding when engaged in for rea-
sons of poverty as it was once viewed domestically in the U.S. See supra notes
203–204 and accompanying text.
290. Barbara Yngvesson, Reconfiguring Kinship in the Space of Adoption, in Inter-
national Adoption: Global Inequalities and the Circulation of Children 103, 105
(Diana Marre & Laura Briggs eds., 2009).
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tween Hague Convention signatories because there is no private adoption
and the birth families are not allowed to meet with the adoptive families;
rather, the agencies act as intermediaries.291
However, information about birth families is supposed to be main-
tained according to the Hague Convention so that such information can
be accessed by children.292  It is widely acknowledged that record keeping
is important for children’s sense of self and security.293  The Convention
of the Rights of the Child gives children a right to know the identity of
birth parents as an element of being raised and treated in their own best
interests.294  Despite this requirement, the lack of substantive, reliable
records is pervasive in ICA.295  Administrative practices in most sending
countries compromise children’s and adoptive families’ efforts to access
information about the circumstances of the child’s birth—not unlike the
practices of western countries half a century ago.296  For instance, China
provides very general information, always saying the child was found and
then provides mere descriptions of the child and a birthdate.297
Adoptive parents in ICA often search for continuing attachments to
birth communities for the sake of their adopted children.298  Parents who
adopt feel connected to their children’s birth countries and try to instill
knowledge and cultural identity in their children to help them make sense
of their complex origins.299  Studies indicate that many international
adoptees desire to connect with their birth culture and racial identity,
291. Ouellette, supra note 38, at 72–73.
292. Id.; Hague Convention, supra note 100, art. 30 (calling for preservation
of information concerning the child’s origin).
293. Shapiro, supra note 216, at 337 (recommending taking steps to preserve
information about the birth family in order to promote a child’s safety and
development).
294. CRC, supra note 147, at art. 7; Michael Freeman, The New Birth Right:
Identity and the Child of the Reproduction Revolution, 4 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 273 (1996).
295. See Shapiro, supra note 216, at 337 (discussing the lack of reliable infor-
mation kept in intercountry adoption); Factsheet: Birth Registration Overview,
UNICEF (2003), http://www.unicef.org/newsline/2003/03fsbirthregistration.htm
[https://perma.cc/R25K-LTHP]; see also MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at
128–32 (describing problems of missing and falsified information in ICA); Ouel-
lette, supra note 38, at 76–77.
296. For discussion of lack of information in ICA, see supra note 295.
297. Ouellette, supra note 38, at 76-77.
298. . Diane B. Kunz, The Re-Invention of Adoption Law: A Reflection, 55 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 853, 858–59 (2010/2011) (“[B]irth cultures are exalted as never
before in the United States.”).
299. . Lynette Clemetson, Adopted in China, Seeking Identity in America, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/us/adopted-
in-china-seeking-identity-in-america.html [https://perma.cc/W6VV-WTTY] (re-
porting that the leading edge of more than 55,000 children adopted from China
by American families are becoming teenagers and beginning to explore their iden-
tities in diverse ways); Solomon, supra note 104 (describing the personal pilgrim-
age to discover adoptive children’s place of origin and familial circumstances pre-
adoption).
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make homeland visits, and learn their native language.300  Adoptive fami-
lies go on journeys of physical, intellectual, and emotional discovery.301
However, specific information is often limited and the search for specific
community affiliations can be difficult.  As Franc¸oise-Romaine Ouellette
aptly notes, these connections are largely to culture, not a family.302
Yet, the yearning of children of ICA is not just to know their culture
but to know their familial origins as well.  A recent BBC documentary,
titled “Meet me on the Bridge,” describes the experience of an adopted
woman from China whose adoptive parents held a note from the birth
parents that was later used to locate the birth parents.  The birth parents
felt compelled to leave her at a market due to their poverty and the one
child policy in China at the time.303  The reunion was celebrated as joy-
ous, and is one of many of such happy anecdotes that have been studied
and seem to strengthen and benefit adoptees.304  The sadness seems only
to be about lost time.  The necessity of keeping records closed and people
alienated from each other until such connections can later joyously and
serendipitously be made despite impossible circumstances is difficult to
justify.
Beyond record keeping and access to information, children have in-
creasingly been recognized to have the right to relationships with persons
with whom they have attachments even if these persons are not their legal
parents, including grandparents, siblings, and other kin,305 and to have
the government support these rights.306  To the extent children’s rights
and interests are at the heart of adoption, adoption should keep contact
with birth families open as it both reflects their stated desires as well as
300. See Wendy Tieman et al., Young Adult International Adoptees’ Search for Birth
Parents, 22 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 678, 678 (2008); Hosu Kim, Mothers Without Mothering:
Birth Mothers from South Korea Since the Korean War, in INTERNATIONAL KOREAN ADOP-
TION: A FIFTY YEAR HISTORY OF POLICY AND PRACTICE 131, 143 (Kathleen Ja Sook
Bergquist et al. eds., 2007) (highlighting that Korean birth mothers are viewed as
the “primal bond to the adoptees’ racial/cultural identity in the growing, pos-
tadoption, and service economy, i.e., annual cultural festivals, culture camps, and
trips to the motherland”).
301. See Tieman, supra note 300, at 678; Kim, supra note 300, at 151.
302. Ouellette, supra note 38, at 77.
303. Changfu Chang, The Secret Note that Led to My Birth Parents—Meet Me on the
Bridge, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/av/stories-
42257906/the-secret-note-that-led-to-my-birth-parents [https://perma.cc/XP2A-
NWUU].
304. Yngvesson, supra note 290, at 103 (describing several such cases of
reunification and the joy and resolution they brought, characterizing these meet-
ings as realizing a biological reality that already exists).
305. See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006);
Barbara Bennet Woodhouse, “Are You My Mother?”: Conceptualizing Children’s Iden-
tity Rights in Transracial Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107 (1995); Anne
C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2166–67 (2011).
306. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Relational Rights of Children, 48 CONN. L. REV.
741, 780–82 (2016) (discussing the right of children to have their relationships
supported by the state).
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provides significant benefits according to empirical accounts.307  Given
modern understandings of the centrality of identity, particularly in the
context of ICA where racial disparities are usually involved, it is hard to
imagine how closed adoption is good for children.308  As Tobias
Hubinette explains, summarizing a body of literature that focuses on inter-
views with interracial adoptees, “What is striking in the empirical results is
the always-present feeling of profound bodily alienation and racial isola-
tion.”309  Knowing and being in contact with birth families can quell such
concerns.  While intercountry adoption has resulted in overwhelmingly
positive development and educational based-outcomes for children,310
contact with birth families can assist with emotional turmoil many children
of ICA experience as they age and struggle with their own identities.311
Empirical studies of the benefits of open adoption, response to chil-
dren’s express desires, and changing perceptions about children’s rights
to relationships have fostered support for open adoption domestically in
the U.S., along with birth parents’ demands for contact and their higher
bargaining power.312  But, good will and understanding of children’s need
for identity has not sufficiently crossed over into the international realm.
The idea that the U.S. was willing to separate the children of illegal immi-
grants from their parents and detain them separately, has recently caused
307. Appell, supra note 254, at 1060–61 (“If adoption is to become truly child-
centered, those participating in it as professionals, advocates, parents, law makers,
and adjudicators must resist defining the process as the creation of one family and
the dissolution of another.  To the contrary, adoption should be viewed as a way to
provide continuity and security for children whose parents are unable or unwilling
to care for them, and not as a way to provide adults with children to build a family.
Conceptualizing adoption as a service for children, not adults, enables the recogni-
tion that adults cannot force children to relinquish all ties to their origin; rather,
children are forever and inextricably bound to their birth families, even while lov-
ing, caring for, and belonging with their substitute caretakers.”); Malinda L.
Seymore, Openness in International Adoption, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 163,
184–86 (2015) (discussing the importance of children’s right to identity in know-
ing birth parents).
308. Ouellette, supra note 38, at 79 (“In what circumstances can it be said that
the interests of the child lie in breaking all connections with his or her birth family
as a social and symbolic source of identity and belonging?  Even when ties to the
birth parents are severed, should the child become a stranger to his or her entire
kin group?”).
309. Tobias Hubinette, Post-Racial Utopianism, White Color-Blindness and “the Ele-
phant in the Room”: Racial Issues for Transnational Adoptees of Color, in INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 221, 225 (Judith L. Gibbons &
Karen Smith Rotabi eds., 2012); MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 108–09
(summarizing studies of the psychological identity concerns faced by children of
ICA).
310. See MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 21; ROTABI & BROMFIELD,
supra note 9, at 2.
311. See, e.g., Yngvesson, supra note 290, at 106–09 (stressing the importance
of building a kinship framework to build identity for children adopted from
abroad).
312. See supra notes 254–255 and accompanying text.
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an outcry in the U.S.313  But our treatment of the poor, migrant foreigner
has consistently been to expect familial associations different from what
we would accept for ourselves.314  Migrant laborers both legal and illegal
work incredibly hard at low paying jobs that U.S. citizens often are not
willing to do and often live apart from their families sending payments
back to support family-members.315  Family separation is thereby already
occurring in order to feed children.  Intercountry adoption also involves
separation due to poverty but should not involve cutting all ties in
perpetuity due to poverty and crisis.
Advocates have noted that the benefits of cross-cultural bridge build-
ing and understanding are an important aspect of ICA.316  Open ICA can
create bonds between diverse countries as opposed to the more colonialist
perspective of removing children to solve infertility problems for rich wes-
terners.317  More than creating bonds with the children themselves, and
the corresponding understanding that racial differences do not negate fa-
milial relations,318 bonds can be created with families that live in foreign
countries creating greater understanding of the other and a more inter-
connected global community.
Not only is openness a more ethical way to treat children and birth
families, it is also the only realistic way to resolve the major legal and ethi-
cal impediments to ICA as it currently functions.319  Concerns about fraud
and falsification of birth records can only be credibly resolved by opening
the adoption process and guaranteeing that relatives and kin are in con-
tact with adoptive families.320  Mere records are not sufficient; rather, face-
to-face meetings and connections need to be maintained.  In this way,
adoptive parents can be sure of birth-parents’ intentions, have mutual un-
derstanding regarding continued contact, and the identities of all involved
would be clear.  Given continuous contact, the fears of fraud—kidnap-
ping, lack of consent, falsified records, and the need for prophylactic mea-
sures countries have taken to avoid it—would be less pressing.  Ultimately,
the threats of fraud have been pervasive, and it is not clear if openness will
cure all the ills of ICA—but given the potential benefits, there is sufficient
reason to attempt this radically different way of framing adoption.
313. See, e.g., Karl Vick, Maya Rhodan & Molly Ball, Border War, TIME, July 2,
2018, at 26–33 (series of articles dedicated to discussing the trauma of the separa-
tion of illegal parents from their infant and minor children).
314. See HACKER, supra note 102, at 243.
315. See id.
316. MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 14–15, 174–78; Bartholet, The
Child’s Story, supra note 30, at 350–52; Ouellette, supra note 38, at 83 (“Adoption
issues are connected with overarching societal questions regarding cultural plural-
ism.  It is an important to factor them into our thinking and generate dialogue
about the institution.”).
317. See Perry, supra note 31, at 101.
318. See Yngvesson, supra note 290, at 108–09.
319. See supra Part II(B).
320. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 151–52.
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Open ICA has been practiced in limited circumstances.321  In the
Marshall Islands, adoption is understood to involve openness by its nature.
When confronted with the prospect of open ICA, nearly 70% of prospec-
tive birth parents responded positively and many favored such open ar-
rangements.322  Such open arrangements likely require intermediaries to
arrange contact between adoptive and birth families, but such in-
termediaries are already involved in a financial capacity.323  A study of
these adoptions in the Marshall Islands demonstrated that birth parents
had an entirely different perspective on adoption than baby-sales, as they
believed that at age 18, children would return to them well-educated and
wealthy and that their parenthood had not been entirely relinquished, al-
though they would not raise their children themselves.324  They had posi-
tive views toward adoption, felt a connection with adoptive parents, and
allegations of abuse and fraud were absent.  Furthermore, birth parents
often give gifts and scholarships to birth parents and their children.325
The Marshall Islands model is worthy of imitation.
Calls for open adoption have been made by some adoption advo-
cates.326  For instance, in their recent book, SAVING INTERNATIONAL ADOP-
TION, the co-authors argue that the private market should govern
international adoption so that birth families and adoptive families can
meet and negotiate their own terms in private ordering.327  The authors
are focused more on the benefits of private ordering than on openness,
however, as the co-authors want to leave it up to private negotiations to
determine whether the adoptions remain open or are more closed.328
However, as will be discussed in the following sections, unequal bargaining
power and cultural and linguistic barriers can make parity in private nego-
tiations difficult to rely upon.
321. Ouellette, supra note 38, at 78–81.
322. See Seymore, supra note 307, at 186 (citing Jini L. Roby et al., Openness in
International Adoption: A Study of U.S. Parents Who Adopted from the Marshall Islands, 8
ADOPTION Q. 47, 51 (2005)); ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 53–55; Scher-
man, supra note 251, at 290.
323. See Seymore, supra note 307, at 186.
324. Id. at 186–87.
325. ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 55.
326. See HACKER, supra note 102, at 240–42 (calling for open adoption as part
of an intercountry adoption system focused on feeding children in need); MONT-
GOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 139–49 (advocating an open free market sys-
tem of adoption); Scherman, supra note 251, at 290–91 (suggesting the future of
ICA should involve openness and contact). See generally Seymore, supra note 307
(arguing that identity rights of children and concerns about fraud support open-
ing international adoption).
327. MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 148–52.
328. Id.
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B. Charity and Wealth Transfer
The second element of an interconnected system of ICA is permitting
the transfer of money from adoptive parents to birth parents or birth com-
munities.  From a frame of interconnection as opposed to acquisition, the
monetary transfer can be allowed to provide for birth families’ needs, en-
hance their security and well-being, feed remaining children, and enrich
birth communities as opposed to acquiring exclusive rights to a child.
Adoptive families will in any event spend significant monies on the adop-
tion and, thus, it is hard to justify the payment of money to all parties
concerned except the birth families.329  Connecting to birth families also
means allowing them to benefit financially from the adoption process, be-
cause it is often their lack of resources and poverty that make the adoption
necessary.
However, the free market is an inappropriate apparatus for managing
such transfers of wealth.  Payments to birth parents should be regulated to
ensure they do not act to exploit or induce baby-sales, or even to become
pregnant, but instead facilitate participation in the process for those who
are already unable to care for children.330  The fear of commodification
and exploitation of birth parents and children justify a regulated market.
Legal limitations on the amount of payment could limit the fear of undue
pressure.  According to the Hague Convention, expenses are allowed to be
paid to birth parents.331  But, beyond payment of expenses, payments to
birth parents could cover a similar range of expenses covered in domestic
adoption, including lost wages during pregnancy and while navigating the
adoption system, payments that are not currently allowed under the
Hague Convention.332  Upon meeting birth families, such payments may
seem just and proper as an act of good will towards people in need and
can dignify the system.333
Alternately, if birth families are not identifiable, money could be paid
to communities to provide social services for families and remaining chil-
329. O’HALLORAN, supra note 127, at 818; Meier & Zhang, supra note 110, at
100–05 (discussing how public agencies took large profits from international adop-
tion); MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 143–44; Krawiec, supra note 13, at
247–50.
330. Blair, supra note 95, at 356–64 (describing alleged inducements to birth
mothers in Cambodia and Guatemala); Long, supra note 96, at 645–46 (describing
allegations of women induced by money to give up children and even women be-
coming pregnant to gain money from payments provided by mediators in interna-
tional adoption); Oreskovic & Maskew, supra note 96, at 115.
331. Hague Convention, supra note 100, at art. 32 (“No one shall derive im-
proper financial or other gain from an activity related to an intercountry adop-
tion” and that only reasonable expenses may be charged or paid).  Article 29
reinforces the ban on improper financial inducements by prohibiting contact be-
tween prospective adoptive parents and the birth parents prior to the adoption.
Id. at art. 29.
332. MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 143–44.
333. Id. at 143–45 (describing discomfort with being unable to provide some
money or gifts to struggling birth parents in ICA).
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dren.  For instance, Shani King suggests that mandatory contributions to
sending communities could ameliorate fears of exploitation and colonial-
ization and provide benefits to poverty-stricken communities.334  Indeed,
there is a project in Piemonte, Italy that mandates that those who adopt
internationally make payments to an organization that supports capacity
building in that country to avoid the need for ICA in the future and allow
families and communities to raise children in the countries of their na-
tional origin.335  While I think such programs are less beneficial than  di-
rect contact with birth families, both in terms of benefits to children and
family-making collaborators and in terms of effectiveness in reducing cor-
ruption and fraud, they reflect a move towards recognizing collaboration
and the need for charity as opposed to a system based on acquisition.
Indeed, as Daphne Hacker characterizes ICA, it is not just about fam-
ily-making, it is also about feeding hungry children.336  Hacker categorizes
intercountry adoption with parental remittances—money sent back home
from work abroad—and child labor as various means of meeting the basic
needs of children living in poverty.337  While ICA as I have characterized it
is still fundamentally about family-making, focusing also on the ways adop-
tion can feed the hungry can help us transition from a more selfish per-
spective on family-making to a more giving, shared, interconnected vision
that maintains focus on children’s rights and needs.  The idea of adoption
as charity is not new, it is a common justification for choosing ICA.338  A
better balance between charity and the desire for family-making can be
found in a system of open adoption that allows payments to birth families
and children that remain behind, and the maintenance of birth identity
and family connections which advance children’s interests, than a system
of closed adoption based on a frame of acquisition where adoptive parents
have exclusive rights to children, and agents and intermediaries are paid,
but birth parents are not.
We are in an era of unprecedented migration of peoples in search of
better lives and sufficient sustenance worldwide.339  In the U.S. and be-
yond there is significant apprehension about immigration in general, and
334. . King, supra note 31, at 464.
335. See REGIONE PIEMONTE, http://www.arai.piemonte.it/cms/media/files/
PUBBLIC_%20semi%20di%20cooperazione(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/E7L3-
N2WG] (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (in Italian, translation provided by Prof. Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Emory Law School).
336. HACKER, supra note 102, at 242–44.
337. Id. at 197–244.
338. See ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 2 (citing studies of the charita-
ble desires of adoptive parents).
339. See, e.g., Gustavo Capdevila, Unprecedented Human Migration Cries Out for a
Global Response, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (June 25, 2018), http://www.ips
news.net/2018/06/unprecedented-human-migration-cries-global-response/
[https://perma.cc/3HJU-R9NF].
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illegal immigration, in particular.340  Migrants are searching for more eco-
nomic and political stability and a way to feed their families.  It is funda-
mentally disconcerting to use poverty as a reason to terminate parental
rights.341  In the domestic context, advocates and scholars such as Dorothy
Roberts and Richard Wexler have argued forcefully that parental termina-
tion systems confuse poverty with neglect and that economic stability can
preserve parental connections.342  They argue for the abolition of the fos-
ter care system in favor of social welfare programs.343  One could argue
that similarly, in the context of ICA, if there was enough aid distributed
throughout the world eliminating poverty, could stave off the need for
most international adoptions.  But, there is also a difference between the
legal and ethical responsibility that the U.S. has to its own citizens and its
obligation or capacity to cure the inefficiencies, corruption, and political
instability of failing economies abroad.  While some argue that the money
spent on adoption is better off being sent to poverty-stricken communi-
ties,344 there is no way to demand or even incentivize people to do so
unless they have a connection to that foreign community which intercoun-
try adoption can provide.345  Although intercountry adoption could not
340. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter & Karl Russell, Migrants Are on the Rise Around the
World, and Myths About Them Are Shaping Attitudes, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2018, https:/
/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/20/business/economy/immigration-ec-
onomic-impact.html [https://perma.cc/E8MA-AJY8] (describing unprecedented
global migration from south to north and the many forms fear of immigrants and
immigration takes).
341. See MONTGOMERY & POWELL, supra note 97, at 29; Intercountry Adoption
Policy Brief, SAVE THE CHILDREN (June 2012), resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/
node/6250/pdf/6250.pdf [Permalink unavailable] (“Poverty and a lack of re-
sources should never be a reason for separation of a child from his or her fam-
ily.”); Ellen Pinderhughes et al., A Changing World: Shaping Practices Through
Understanding of the New Realities of Intercountry Adoption, THE DONALDSON ADOPTION
INSTITUTE (October 2013), https://adoptioninstitute.org/old/publications/
2013_10_AChangingWorld.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L55-3T38].
342. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of
Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474 (2012); Richard Wexler, Take the Child and
Run: Tales from the Age of ASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 129 (2001) (describing in
detail the connection of poverty, foster care, and termination of parental right).
See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
(2002).
343. ROBERTS, supra note 342; Roberts, supra note 342; Wexler, supra note
342, at 129.
344. Bergquist, supra note 146, at 349; King, supra note 31, at 425.
345. Carlson, supra note 24, at 752–53 (“Not having sought to adopt, these
non-adoptive parents would be no more likely than anyone else to have developed
any connection or commitment with any particular orphanage or aid organization.
They would be no more obliged than anyone else to send any amount of their
money to orphanages.”); Jonathan Dickens, The Paradox of Inter-Country Adoption:
Analysing Romania’s Experience as a Sending Country, 11 INT’L J. SOC. WELFARE 76
(2002); Michael Ambrose & Anna Mary Coburn, Report on Intercountry Adoption in
Romania, USAID 2 (Jan. 22, 2001) (discussing how intercountry adoption can
harm children left behind).
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solve the global problem of children’s poverty and neglect,346 one way to
address those needs would be to allow intercountry adoption as a means of
wealth transfer, allowing wealth to be transferred from westerners seeking
to raise foreign children to the hungry poor.  By building connections,
ICA may not only ease the plight of individual children, but also improve
the plight of other children in those countries, as would appear to have
occurred in the case of Romania, by bringing needed resources and atten-
tion to the plight of orphans.347  And, as discussed above, the frame of
interconnection can differentiate such transfers from acquisition and cor-
ruption in favor of collaboration and kinship.
However, while charity and wealth transfer are part of intercountry
adoption, wealth transfers should be a mandatory form of payment and
not merely “gifts” or pure “charity.”  Financial “gift” giving to countries of
origin is a standard practice among adoptive families who visit their chil-
dren’s birth communities or orphanages: “[gift giving] is standard practice
for returning families.  Help the place that raised and protected your
daughter in some way.”348  This way of viewing adoption—through an ide-
ology of “giving”—staves off concerns that motherhood should not be
commodified.349  However, “any gift without a counter-gift gives the donor
excessive power over the receiver.”350  In intercountry adoption, power
imbalances between adoptive families and birth families are already at is-
sue and, therefore, a gift frame should be avoided in favor of the frame of
interconnection within a limited and regulated market.
C. Government as Facilitator of Interconnection
Finally, the government must retain a significant role in facilitating
intercountry adoptions, albeit in a different way than conceived in the
Hague Convention under the frame of acquisition while avoiding com-
modification.  Instead of merely attempting to keep records, mediate
adoption placements, and ensure that birth families do not receive money,
government facilitators should work towards facilitating positive intercon-
nections between family law-collaborators.  Open adoption is based on the
concept of communication between the parties involved in the adoption
process.351  It is necessary to have an intermediary beyond the free market
to ensure that the collaborative family-making functions appropriately in a
346. See, e.g., Bergquist, supra note 146, at 349–50 (critiquing international
adoption for the small percentage of children in need it reaches).
347. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 24, at 755.
348. Solomon, supra note 104, at 42; see also Families Without Borders, Guate-
malan Adoption, and the Best Interests of the Child: An Informative Study, UNICEF, at 54
(Nov. 2003), http://www.familieswithoutborders.com/FWBstudyGuatemala.pdf
(describing how many adoptive families give back to Guatemala through support
for local charities, donations of medical supplies, food and clothing, and funding
for community development projects).
349. Cadoret, supra note 28, at 277.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 277–80.
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manner that facilitates a fair transaction that respects and recognizes both
sides of the collaboration—“between takers and givers without the child or
the birth mother turned into merchandise.”352
Unlike in domestic adoption, where the lack of infants gives birth par-
ents bargaining power and thus open adoption is left to private ordering,
one must assume that birth families in ICA do not have the sophistication
or bargaining power to secure terms that meet their interests at the negoti-
ating table.  Instead, we should apply what has been learned from domes-
tic adoption regarding the benefits of openness to all collaborators.  The
law should give power to international collaborators, especially because
they do not have sufficient power to make demands in private ordering.
Moreover, expecting the parties to write a contract in intercountry adop-
tion is not realistic given limits in resources, cultural gaps, and language
barriers.  Even if a contract were written, birth parents would need assis-
tance from an international agency to facilitate or, if necessary, to enforce
it.
More importantly, government facilitation of open adoption has the
potential to manage and mitigate fraud and abuse.  If birth parents do not
disappear, it will be harder for intermediaries to hide abusive practices
and kidnapping.  Getting to know the birth family can clear up misunder-
standings, clarify records, and help assure consent.  Pessimists may argue
that the horrors of the baby-markets will produce “fake parents” or fake
death certificates to hide abuse.  To the extent possible, ICA governmental
agencies must be charged with rooting out abuse because adoption with-
out such oversight cannot be allowed.  One might even counter that if a
country is rich enough to ensure that a formal open adoption system
works, they would be unlikely to need ICA at all—it is only desperation
that causes people to send their children away.  And, one can never be
sure that there will not be fraud and abuse because there will inevitably be
money at stake in a functioning system of adoption.  Even in the domestic
U.S. with illegal immigrant children, we are afraid of illegal adoptions tak-
ing place!353  How can we ensure that such travesties do not occur abroad?
Indeed, I have argued that, due to international surrogacy’s elevated po-
tential for abuse, domestic surrogacy should be preferred, and interna-
tional surrogacy avoided.354
Still, in a system of open adoption, parents may not feel that they are
giving up their child entirely and may prefer their child grows up abroad,
352. Id. at 280 (suggesting that intermediaries are necessary to manage inter-
actions between agents of demand and supply in the context of intimate markets
such as adoption, surrogacy and organ donation).
353. Kathryn Joyce, The Threat of International Adoption for Migrant Children Sep-
arated from their Families, INTERCEPT (July 1, 2018, 9:37 AM), https://theintercept.
com/2018/07/01/separated-children-adoption-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/
QGJ4-PVRK] (discussing the fate of adoption that meets children who are sepa-
rated from illegal immigrant parents and are never reunited).
354. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 1274–75; Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 174,
at 139, 147–48.
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as has occurred in the Marshall Islands.355  Moreover, in the context of
open ICA, it is more possible to maintain an ongoing connection than in
international surrogacy because there is a greater recognition of birth par-
ent status in our culture as genetics is usually viewed as a more significant
contribution than gestation, which is merely characterized as “incuba-
tion.”356  And, while surrogates build connections during surrogacy, which
is not practical when surrogates are abroad, in adoption the connection is
inherently genetic and based on birth status.  Most importantly, although
nothing can guarantee that fraud will not exist in destitute countries, I
would argue that the risk is more than worth taking in ICA than in interna-
tional surrogacy, given the benefit of raising children in need.  Saving a
life should ethically take precedence over achieving the dream of a geneti-
cally-related child.  Given the poverty and suffering worldwide, the con-
stant migration and devastation, there may be no better solution than an
open system of adoption that builds bridges between cultures, between the
wealthy and privileged and the poor.  In light of the lack of aid to meet
the basic needs and protections of all peoples, not trying to create an
open, ethical system of ICA is also problematic.
Distance, along with language and cultural barriers, will make such
understandings and ad hoc engagement more complex in intercountry
adoption.357  Openness in ICA may require long-distance communica-
tions, overcoming language and cultural barriers, electronic communica-
tions, and even occasional travel.  What such relationships might look like
is still a matter of conjecture as open ICA is currently rare,358 but it is safe
to assume that they will be as varied and multi-faceted as domestic open
adoption where interconnections are strong and then weak and different
roles are played at different times.359
Finally, the geographic and cultural distance between parties in ICA,
as well as the socio-economic disparities, may elevate the fear of entangle-
ments with birth families and elevate wealthy foreigners’ fear of being
harassed.  Fears of entanglements also occur in the context of domestic
adoption.360  People fear the other—the stranger—but collaborators need
355. See supra notes 321–325 and accompanying text.
356. I do not agree with this perspective, but it does reflect modern legal
treatment of surrogacy. See Smith & Smith v. Jones & Jones, No. 85-532014, WL
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County March 15, 1986) (holding that the intended mother
who donated the egg was the legal mother due to her genetic donation and pro-
claiming the gestational surrogate “a human incubator”); Perry-Rogers v. Fasano,
715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 2000); see also, e.g., A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (rejecting the intended parents’ and gestational
surrogate’s joint claim that the surrogate merely acted as an incubator and term-
ing that argument a “simplistic comparison” because it ignores the fact that there
are human emotions and biological changes involved in pregnancy).
357. ROTABI & BROMFIELD, supra note 9, at 289–90.
358. See supra notes 321–323 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 257–258 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., Ouellette, supra note 38, at 77.
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to be able to work together.  Regulations must be put into place with inter-
national government agencies acting as overseers to prevent harassment
and fraud.  While instances of harassment occur, domestic adoption stud-
ies demonstrate the benefits of openness and note that the fear is greater
than the actual threat of entanglements.  Nonetheless, such entangle-
ments will have to be understood as a cost to the transaction for adoptive
parents even if they would prefer to avoid such entanglements as entangle-
ments are part of working together in collaboration.361
VI. CONCLUSION
The desire to have children can overwhelm and incentivize those who
want to be parents to go to great lengths when simple traditional coital sex
is not the answer.  Parenthood is a worthy and valuable goal and alterna-
tive methods should not be readily banned.  However, when alternative
methods intimately and essentially involve other peoples’ bodies, lives, ge-
netic and emotional connections, those people and their connections,
emotions, and attachments cannot be acquired in a conventional market
manner.  This is because, ethically and legally, we must avoid treating
humans as commodities, as objects and not subjects, as a means of ob-
taining one’s own ends and not as interest bearers in their own rights.
Although poverty can lead people into exploitative and commodifying
transactions, the law must rise above and refuse this corruption.  Avoiding
fears of commodification and exploitation need not involve banning fi-
nancial exchanges.  Rather, through a frame of interconnection and ongo-
ing contact we can preserve the humanity of family-law collaborators,
while attempting to thwart fraud and corruption.
361. See supra notes 262–269 and accompanying text.
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